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In view of the rapidly changing security environment surrounding Japan—the
growing Soviet military buildup, the relative decline of U.S. military, economic, and
diplomatic power, and the growing influence of its regional neighbors in the
Asian-Pacific region, the time has arrived for Japan to consider assuming greater
responsibilities in its security and diplomatic policies.
Until recently, Japan, despite its strong economy, has had no clearly defined role
either in international politics or in the politics of the Asian-Pacific region. This thesis
examines how Japan is becoming increasingly aware that it must play a more active
role in .the Asian-Pacific region and of the responsibilities it should assume for regional
development. In addition, this thesis examines Japan's position and relations with the
countries in the Asian-Pacific region, and considers the problems and options which
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I. INTRODUCTION
Geographically, racially, culturally, and historically, Japan is part of Asia. For
more than a century, Japan has been seeking to reconcile its sense of Asian identity
with its desire for international status and the security provided by a commitment to
the Western international order. However, from the political and military perspectives,
postwar Japan has remained in many respects, a limited power. Japan has the
potential to be a major world power in both political and military aspects, but how
soon will this potential be translated into reality?
Regardless of the wishes or perceptions of its people, Japan is finding itself in the
role of a pace-setter, taking its place beside those of other world leaders. Along with
the prestige of being an international actor comes not only increased visibility but also
vastly increased responsibilities. With all due credit to the industrious, conscientious,
and disciplined nature of the Japanese people, it cannot be denied that the
phenomenal economic successes they enjoy would not have been possible without a
national security policy which has been relatively cheap and effective. On the other
hand, the Japanese cannot be fully held responsible for assuming only limited military
responsibilities—there was a view in Washington that growth in Japan's economic
power was in itself one effective way to counter the expansion of Soviet strategic
influence [Ref. 1: p. 19]. Therefore, as long as the United States, with its world-wide
nuclear deterrent and strong armed forces, maintained its defense commitment, Japan's
security was virtually guaranteed. Moreover, since Japan's internal security did not
constitute a problem, it found little need to embark on an expansion of its own military
forces, relying on the guarantee of the "security blanket" provided by the United
States.
These conditions are now changing, however. The security picture in the
Asian-Pacific region has become more complicated, creating pressures for Japan to
enlarge its political and defense postures. The Soviet Union has markedly strengthened
its military power and posture for the past several years. It has been increasing the
force levels, both qualitatively and quantitatively, of its military. The buildup of Soviet
forces is based on a much broader and more aggressive long-range strategy than its
earlier buildup against China. Japan has yet to increase its defense forces on a scale
comparable to those countries with similar economic potential. It must face the reality
of the need to reassess its political and security policies because of shifting strategic
relations in Asia.
The Soviet military buildups in Soviet Asia and the Western Pacific, and the
relative decline in American power pose new security problems for Japan. Improved
Soviet air and naval projection capabilities are beginning to limit the once unchallenged
global influence of US forces, while increasing the Soviet ability to project power into
the region. Moreover, Soviet expansion of influence to strategically important Third
World countries such as Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Afghanistan further strengthens the
USSR's position. [Ref. 2: p. 7] Indeed, the fact is that the United States can no longer
afford to go it alone in the Pacific Basin. Manpower requirements are becoming more
urgent and costly:
We are faced with the widening gap between the forces on hand and the forces
needed to fulfill our global commitments. Our threats grow faster than our
capabilities. We are spread far too thin. . . . [Ref. 3: p. 30]
The new environment forces Japan to reassess its national interests and defense
policies—does Japan have sufficient defense capability to cope with the changing
security environment, to pursue and protect those national security interests?
The growth of Soviet military power in the Pacific also raises the question of the
role the United States will play in the future-the relative parity in the US-USSR
strategic nuclear balance has somewhat weakened the credibility of the American
nuclear deterrent. Indeed, a perception of American weakness has slowly been
evolving since the 1970s. The Nixon Doctrine and the US defeat in Vietnam, the
consideration of troop withdrawal from the Korean peninsula, and the
"swing-strategy" (the movement of American naval forces from the Western Pacific to
the Indian Ocean in the event of a Middle East contingency) have all contributed to
misgivings among US allies in Asia about the credibility of the American commitment
[Ref. 4: p. 157]. Moreover, the relative decline of American economic power, as
manifested in the more than $39 billion trade deficit with Japan in 1985 [Ref. 5],
furtheF enhances this perception of weakness.
What might this perception of the United States portend for Japan? Japan has
always been interested in achieving its goals of prosperity and security, but it also has
ambitions of acquiring greater international status, tending to lead the country in the
direction of exerting a more active influence in world alTairs. This is particularly true
in the Asian-Pacific region where it may have to take a more active and less aligned
position in the struggles for influence in the region along with other major actors, su«h
as the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. Events of the late 1960s and early
1970s provided an impetus for Japan to search for ways in which it could play a more
active role in international affairs. The Nixon shocks and the oil crises forced the
Japanese to take a realistic look at their lack of political clout and economic
invulnerability.
Unless otherwise stated, all monetary figures are US$.
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Events in more recent times seem to further confirm this trend towards a search
for a greater political role commensurate with its economic strength. For example,
immediately upon taking office in November 1982, Prime Minister Nakasone
2
Yasuhiro"6 began to pursue positive policies in such areas as defense and foreign policy.
Before his succession as prime minister, Nakasone held several ministerial posts such as
Minister of Transport, Minister of International Trade and Industry, and
Director-General of the Defense Agency [Ref. 6], so he is not a newcomer to questions
concerning defense and international matters.
Nakasone's major diplomatic success in the Asian-Pacific region has been the
improvement of relations with South Korea. Before he took office, Japanese relations
with Korea had chilled because of an impasse on negotiations concerning an economic
aid package. In an attempt to ease the economic tensions between the two countries,
he offered South Korea a S4 billion loan over a seven-year period during his visit there
in January 1983. That event marked a new era in bilateral relations between Japan
and South Korea when Nakasone became the first Japanese Prime Minister since
World War II to visit Seoul; South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan reciprocated
with a visit to Japan the following year. Although this diplomatic exchange did not
immediately solve all of the economic and political problems between the two
countries, it did however, assure that Japanese-Korean relations were once again on a
smoother course.
In the succeeding months, Prime Minister Nakasone visited President Reagan in
Washington and made assurances that he would strengthen Japan's defense
commitment; he also settled the issue of military technology transfer by making the
^In accordance with Asian custom, all Asian names appearing in this thesis will
be given with their family name first.
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United States an exception to the arms export ban. After his visit to the United States,
he embarked upon a two week tour of the five non-Communist countries in the
Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN)--Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand-- in May 1983. The main purpose of his trip was to dispel any
anxieties about the possible threat to ASEAN's security posed by a remilitarized Japan.
He reassured the leaders of ASEAN that Japan would maintain a sufficient self defense
capability well within the context of the US-Japan Security Treaty and within the the
limits prescribed by Japan's constitution as a means of fulfilling both US and NATO
expectations for shouldering a greater share of the defense burden in East Asia.
[Ref. 7: pp. 04, 05] Reviews of Prime Minister Nakasone's trip by the Southeast Asian
press were generally favorable. ASEAN's approval of Japan's renewed defense efforts
was, in effect, a "qualified endorsement" [Ref. 8: p. 13].
In light of these perceptions and developments in the Asian-Pacific region, what
should be the objectives of Japan? As much of the future will be shaped in Asia, the
maintenance of stability in this region—vital to achieving global peace-is clearly one
important objective. Another objective would be Japan's involvement in the social,
economic, and political development of the region sufficient to deter foreign threats.
Finally, Japan should continue its policy of "skillful diplomacy", that of maintaining
smooth relations and building ties with diverse countries of this region which share
fundamental interests. Peace and stability in the region will assure a favorable
geopolitical environment for Japan's own security, and the maintenance of an
economically prosperous and politically stable Asia-Pacific will serve as a safeguard
against Soviet influence.
While Japan has managed to become a major power without also becoming a
major military power, will this stance continue to be a viable one? For a nation whose
12
influence in a complex regional environment is increasingly becoming more pervasive,
Japan will find that it must develop a workable plan whereby it can assume its rightful
role, and at the same time protect its own political and economic interests.
Japan has managed to avoid the realities of international politics to a degree
extraordinary for a country of its immense economic power and importance, but the
time has arrived for Japan to confront these realities on the international scene, and it
will do so out of the policies and the pattern of external relations developed during the
past years of its "omni-directional" diplomacy. Already there has been a significant
shift in Japanese attitudes toward foreign affairs. Japan has adopted a more realistic
approach to security matters as evident in the continuing debate over the expansion of
conventional military capabilities, and in diplomatic moves which are calculated to
prove Jts abilities to move independently of the United ^States. Though Japan is
sometimes hampered by its domestic policies, the opportunity is there for a fresh and
vigorous orientation to both global and regional international relations involving
broader Japanese participation.
As will be examined in greater depth in the course of this thesis, Japan will
accomplish its objectives by continuing to pursue its political and economic policies of
strengthening peace and stability not only in the, Asian-Pacific region, but world-wide
as well. Increased economic assistance, cultural diplomacy, and political involvement
will be the instruments by which Japan will assume its position as an international
state.
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II. JAPAN'S SECURITY POLICIES
Japanese leaders believe and continually emphasize that non-military measures,
to include political persuasion and pressure, and economic and technical assistance, are
alternative ways to assure security. Japan's perspective on national security issues can
be best understood in the Japanese concept of "comprehensive security":
In order to ensure Japan's peace and security, it is necessary to promote various
measures in diplomatic, economic, defense and other fields in a harmonized
manner from the viewpoint of comprehensive security. Among these measures,
defense capability is what may be called the last resort Japan can rely on when it
faces armed attacks. [Ref. 9: p. 49]
This rather vague policy was first articulated by the government of Prime Minister
Ohira and continued by Prime Minister Suzuki. The nature of this concept is based
on two underlying principles, that first of all, Japan's security is not exclusively
dependent upon its military capabilities, and secondly, Japan's foreign and domestic
policies must be developed in a comprehensive and consistent fashion. [Refs. 10,9] It
wasn't until 1981 that Prime Minister Ito spelled out the policy in a more concrete
manner:
m
(1) Continuation of the US-Japan security relationship
(2) Moderate but high-quality military capabilities to be used exclusively for
defense
(3) International economic cooperation
(4) International cooperation and collaboration in energy resources, science, and
technology [Ref. 11: p. 169]
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In view of these principles, how could this concept of comprehensive security be
interpreted? First of all, it could be seen as a transitional stage for Japan, one that is
moving from an almost excessive emphasis on economics as a diplomatic tool, to one
that is gradually broadening the scope of its foreign policy objectives, possibly
including defense. Secondly, it could be interpreted as Japan's implicit recognition of
the fact that it can no longer pursue its economic policies without taking into account
the interests of other economic powers and the political ramifications thereof. Finally
there is an awareness that continuing the security arrangements with the United States
and international economic cooperation entail a more active diplomatic and foreign
policy role for Japan. [Ref. 11: p. 170]
If comprehensive security implies a transition to a more active involvement in
international affairs, how will Japan assume such a world role? Based on its past
emphasis on economics, it is reasonable to predict that Japan will slowly and gradually
become more diplomatically active, especially in those areas which have a direct
bearing on Japanese economic issues. This could be done by the strengthening of
equitable trade relations and by augmenting the level of economic aid. However,
economic power alone cannot afford the basis for an adequate foreign policy. Japan
is beginning to find with the latest upsurge in protectionist sentiments, that it cannot
continue to assume its economic growth poses no threat or challenge to the rest of the
world, nor can it not afford to protect the political and economic systems from threat
of external aggression. Tokyo must face up to the inescapable reality of the problem
of its national security and strengthen its self-reliant efforts.
But what if Japan decides not to follow this course? One alternative would be
for Japan to adopt a posture of unarmed neutrality, but this concept is seriously flawed
because of its basis on the precept of "socialist benevolence". The outbreak of
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Sino-Soviet border wars, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the shooting down of
a Korean jetliner, however, all erode the credibility of this stance. Even the major
proponents of this idea—members of the Japan Socialist Party-have moved away from
a once firmly held doctrine, due largely to the obvious lack of a viable defense and
foreign policy [Ref. 12: p. 56]. Because of domestic and external pressures to modify its
security situation, Japan will have to seriously consider assuming an enhanced military
role as part of its comprehensive security policy.
As alluded to earlier in this chapter, defense is only one aspect of Japan's
comprehensive security plan. In Japanese eyes, because of its economic
preponderance, maintaining and promoting its economic security is just as important
as, if not more important than, increasing its military power. The following section
will examine the importance of economic security and how it has become a tool by
which Japan is becoming more politically involved with its neighbors in the
Asia-Pacific region.
A. ECONOMIC SECURITY
Japan's dominance in the world trade market is a topic with which many are
familiar, but what is overlooked by just as many is the fact that Japan has been
emerging as a constructive provider of economic assistance to, and a major overseas
investor of developing countries. Because of Japan's geographic location, most of its
neighbors are developing countries. As a result, Japan has enormous trade and
investments with them. Along with the increase in Japan's economic wealth has been
an increase in its dependency on the lesser developed countries (LDCs) for natural
resources and energy supplies. The political stability and economic development of
developing countries can therefore be said to have major impact upon Japan's own
economic security, and the future course of North-South problems can be expected to
have a far-reaching effect on the future of Japan's economy.
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Japanese leaders have begun to envision their country becoming a world leader
not only in the economic sense but in the political and diplomatic aspects as well. This
has been seen in their attempts to solve the Third World debt crisis and in
championing the South's cause in international meetings. For instance, at the London
summit meeting in 1984, Prime Minister Nakasone interceded on behalf of several
Latin debtor nations for stretching debt payments. In addition, Japan has been leading
the drive to expand the lending power of the World Bank, and in recent years, has
increased the level of Japanese economic aid to developing countries and regions.
[Ref. 13]
Being a member of the Western alliance, Japan has become increasingly involved
in international organizations and forums to deal with the problems of the LDCs.
Japan has been affiliated with such organizations as the Colombo Plan, the World
Bank, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the International Forum, and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) [Ref. 14: p. 229]. It has assumed more international
responsibilities partly as a result of a natural outgrowth of its maturation as a global
economic and political power, but also as a result of the realization of Japan's need to
maintain smooth and friendly relations with resource-rich countries of the developing
world. Japan has been a major contributor to the multi-lateral lending agencies and
has also extended considerable economic assistance on a bilateral basis. Lacking a
military security option mainly due to restrictions imposed by its "Peace Constitution",
Japan has opted for economic assistance as a major foreign policy tool.
The underlying principle to the aid program and the economic course of Japan's
general foreign policy is the assumption, indeed, the belief that prosperity can become
the medium through which political conflict in the East Asian region could be
17
neutralized. Japan's policy-makers reasoned that by the judicious use of sufficient
economic aid to crucial countries or regions, enough political, social, and economic
resiliency could be promoted so that the conditions which would lead to internal
disorder or external interference might never develop [Ref. 15: p. 326J. Japan's former
Prime Minister Sato once said:
By stabilizing a country economically, a way to co-prosperity and coexistence will
be opened. This is the way to abide thoroughly by peace. Japan wishes to move
forward along this course. [Ref. 16]
The evolution of Japan's aid program has been tied to the expansion of trade and
the growth of the country's general international economic position. One of the first
efforts at providing assistance to developing countries was the reparations extended to
Asian -nations as redress for damages inflicted in the course of the unsuccessful
attempt at building a Japanese Empire throughout the region. Although the
obligation to make such payments could hardly be termed "aid", they did, however,
serve to lay the foundation for the ensuing rapid expansion of economic and diplomatic
ties. In effect, these "grants" served as an initial aid program, one with "strings
attached", that is, the recipient nation was required to use the money to purchase
goods from the donor. [Ref. 17: pp. 102-105]
Japan's aid program has changed considerably since then. Beginning with the
early part of this decade, Japan has embarked on a program to improve both the
quality and quantity of its aid to the developing world. Between 1978 and 1980, Japan
more than doubled its annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) allocations,
fulfilling a pledge made by Prime Minister Fukuda in 1977. Moreover, Japan has
started to emphasize a "basic human needs" approach in its ODA. Prime Minister
Suzuki formally introduced this new policy orientation in a January 1981 speech in
18
Bangkok, with particular emphasis on rural and agricultural (including major
infrastructural projects, such as irrigation, electrification, and rural roads); human
resource development (technical assistance); and development of new and renewable
energy. [Ref. 15: p. 326]
Prime Minister Nakasone has continued the course of his predecessors by
increasing budget allocations to Japan's foreign economic assistance program. In a
speech delivered before the 40th United Nations General Assembly, Nakasone stated
that it was Japan's global duty to help developing countries build their nations and
develop their human resources and to act as a "bridge" between North and South.
Therefore, in order to realize this idea, the Japanese government decided to implement
a third mid-term program to double its ODA over the next seven years. The ODA
target for 1986-1992--almost double the previous six years' level-is well over S40
billion (refer to Table 1). [Refs. 18,19: p. 3, p. 2]
Although strings are no longer officially attached, there have been criticisms
raised about the relatively low percentage of the grant element in Japan's ODA.
Measured in terms of a straight percentage of total ODA commitments, Japanese
grants registered a little over 79 percent in 1983, compared to the 85 percent, 71
percent, 97 percent, and 100 percent of the United States, West Germany, Britain, and
Australia, respectively (see Table 2). [Ref. 20: pp. 87-88]
However, in spite of some moves towards increasing the level of grants more
along the guidelines set by the OECD, senior officials of Japan's Overseas Economic
Cooperation Fund (OECF), the government body which administers ODA, have
questioned that policy. In their view, "large-scale development projects would not
work if there were no sense of need or obligation to make a project commercially
viable", and argue that the "aid recipients are being helped more if they are compelled
19
TABLE 1
NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FROM DAC*






Share o( GNP (%) Share of Total (<Vo)
1978/79- 83'84 1971-73 1983 1984 1971-73 1983 1984
USA 3242 8.202 8.055 8698 30% 28 24 24 37 6 29 2 30 4
Japan 711 3.023 3.781 4.319 10.S 0.23 0.32 0.35 8.3 13.7 15.1
France 1.286 4.034 3.815 3.790 69 0.63 074 077 14 9 13.9 13 2
Germany, FR. 881 3.152 3.176 2.782 39 32 48 45 102 11.5 97
Canada 457 1.197 1.429 1.625 08 42 45 50 5 3 5.2 5 7








7 5 5.8 5






















Sweden 50 84 80 2 4 2 7 2 6
DAC, total 28. $47 4.0 0.33 0.36 0.36 100.0 100.0 100.0
*The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is one of the specialized
committees of the OECD. DAC members include Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the Commission of EEC, as
well as countries shown above.
SOURCE: Development Cooperation, 1984, and Press Release, June 27, 1985.
to assure a certain project's economic returns" [Ref. 20: p. 88]. Nonetheless, foreign
pressure for Japan to assume a larger burden, and growing Japanese sympathy for the
plight of the southern-tier of developing countries would probably lead to a further
speed-up of aid. Takashi Hosomi, president of OECF, believes that:
... an increase in grants is inevitable because these can be dispensed without
recipient countries having to find domestic funds, needed when a country such as
Japan gives project loans. [Ref. 20: p. 86]
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TABLE 2




1982 74. 2 90. 4
1983 79.5 91.2
*17 DAC-member countries
SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, cited in Far Eastern Economic Review,
'85," June 13, 1985.
"Japan
Japan disburses well over S4 billion annually in ODA and has become the second
largest aid donor in the free world, in absolute terms. Moreover, Japanese and
American cooperation in coordinating aid policy to ensure smooth and effective flow of
aid resources to Third World countries is probably stronger that that between any
other Western donors. For example, in close cooperation with the United States,
Japan participated in efforts to alleviate the financial hardships of strategically
important Turkey (S70 million in 1979 and $100 million in 1980, 1981), and was the
first Western power to give economic assistance to Pakistan in the aftermath of the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. [Refs. 2,21: p. 322] Table 3 lists the ten major
recipients of Japan's bilateral ODA from the years 1980 through 1983.
For historical, geographical, and political reasons, Japan has tended to favor
Asian countries in its allocation of aid. Some 65 to 75 percent of Japan's ODA goes to
Asia, while the remainder is divided evenly among African, Latin American, and
Middle Eastern countries [Ref. 20: p. 88].
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TABLE 3
TEN MAJOR RECIPIENTS OF JAPAN'S ODA
Rank
1980 1981
$ MIL. % $ MIL. %
1. Indonesia 350. 17.9 Indonesia 299. 8 13. 3
2. Bangladesh 215. 1 11.0 Korea (ROK) 295. 5 13. 1
3. Thailand 189. 5 9.7 Thailand 214. 5 9. 5
4. Burma 152. 5 7.8 Philippines 210. 1 9. 3
5. Egypt 123. 6. 3 Bangladesh 145. 6. 4
6. Pakistan 112.4 5. 7 Burma 125. 4 5. 5
7. Philippines 94. 4 4. 8 Pakistan 117.-
7
5. 2
8. Korea (ROK) 76.3 3. 9 Egypt 70. 7 3. 1
9. Malaysia 65. 6 3.3 Malaysia 64. 7 2. 9
10. Sri Lanka 44. 8 2. 3 Turkey 51. 4 2. 3
Rank
1982 1983
$ MIL. % $ MIL. %
1. China (PRC) 368. 8 15. 6 China (PRC) 350. 2 22. 4
2. Indonesia 294. 6 12. 4 Thailand 248. 1 15. 8
3. Bangladesh 215. 8 9. 1 Indonesia 235. 5 15.
4. Thailand 170. 3 7. 2 Philippines 147. 9. 4
5. Philippines 136. 4 5. 8 India 129. 5 8. 3
6. Burma 103. 4 4. 4 Burma 113. 4 7. 2
7. Pakistan 95. 3 4. Bangladesh 104.2 6. 7
8. Malaysia 75. 3 3.2 Malaysia 92. 3 5. 9
9. Sri Lanka 61. 6 2. 6 Sri Lanka 73. 1 4. 7
10. Egypt 61. 6 2. 6 Pakistan 72. 8 4. 6
SOURCE: Japanese IMinistry of Foreign Affairs, cited in William L. Brooks
and Robert M. Orr, Jr ., "Japan's Foreign Economic Assistance," Asian Survey
3 (March 1985): 330.
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In addition to its ODA program, Japan has maintained technical cooperation
programs, one of which is called the Japanese Expert Service Abroad (JESA) program,
whereby the Japan Overseas Development Corporation (JODC) sends Japanese
technical and management experts to recipient nations [Ref. 22: p. 8], partly out of
Japan's desire to cooperate with recipient countries' in their industrial development,
and partly out of Japan's concern to ensure that its own various overseas aid projects
succeed.
Perhaps one of the most significant measures in 1985 was the Japanese
government's decision to lift the annual admission of Japan Overseas Volunteers
(JOCVs) from 650 to 800; in the first year of the program, 1965, that number was only
41. The JOCVs are currently working in 33 developing countries, and unlike some
earlier counterparts in the US Peace Corps, are well-educated and skilled in fields
ranging from civil engineering to animal husbandry. [Ref. 23: p. 88]
Another method by which Japan seeks to help developing countries on the road
to industrialization is through Direct Foreign Investment (DFI). Apart from the
obvious benefits to Japan, such as deflation of surging export figures [Ref. 23: p. 83],
overseas investment promotes productive activity in the host country, thereby creating
more jobs. Also, the flow of capital through direct investment does not add to the
debt service requirements with which many developing countries are burdened. Instead,
capital flow is usually accompanied by a transfer of technology and managerial
resources. Moreover, in regard to raw materials, host countries have requested that
these be produced locally, so that they not only reap the benefits of exporting higher
value-added goods, but their level of industrialization and export earnings are raised.
[Ref. 24: pp. 264-65]
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Japan's DFI in the Asian-Pacific region remained slight until the mid-1970s. By
the latter part of the 1970s, however, the amount of DFI gradually increased so that
Japan has now replaced the US as the main source of direct investment for the region
[Ref. 25]. World-wide, Japan became the fourth-largest direct overseas investor in 1982
when it overtook France, and some economists have predicted that it is almost certain
to pass West Germany in 1986 if Japan continues its 1985 rate of investment. That
would put Japan among the top three, trailing only the United States and Britain.
Japan's total DFI (as of March 1985) was over S71.4 billion, more than twice the total
four years earlier. The value of Japanese-owned plant and equipment amounted to S18
billion in Asia, just slightly behind the S19.9 billion invested in the US. In other
regions around the world, Japan invested $8.8 billion in Western Europe, S3. 2 billion in
Australia, and $2.9 billion in the Middle East. [Ref. 26]
Japan, in the foreseeable future, will be likely to continue making steady and
significant increases in its foreign aid programs and in overseas investment. In view of
its rapid economic growth, Professor Ezra Vogel, Director of the Program on
US-Japan Relations at Harvard University, believes that these increases in foreign aid
may be large enough to make Japan the largest single aid donor by the mid-1990s
[Ref. 27: p. 758].
By extending economic aid, Japan will have to coordinate and formulate its aid
policies with a broader view of creating a new international system for an increasingly
interdependent world. In this regard, Japan finds itself in a position to contribute
greatly to peace and stability the world over. Continued Japanese economic and
technical assistance to the PRC will not only help it with its modernization efforts, but
it could keep China disposed towards maintaining cooperative relations with the West.
Also, Japanese political support and economic aid to South Korea and the ASEAN
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will help strengthen the position of those countries against the threat of Communism.
[Ref. 2: p. 30]
As seen in this discussion, Japan's diplomatic initiatives are confined largely in
the economic realm. Despite the global extent of its economic interests, however,
Japan's economic contribution to the development of Third World countries is lacking.
Although it was mentioned earlier that Japan is the second-largest aid donor in the
West, the ratio of ODA to GNP is 0.35 percent (1984) ranks Japan tenth among the 17
member-countries of the DAC. [Ref. 25] Obviously, what is required of Japan in this
context is that it needs to increase its level of economic aid, but even this might not be
sufficient. As Japan becomes more politically involved in the international scene, it
becomes more exposed to the political, economic, and military dangers inherent in such
an international role. Japan, with its enormous economic capacity and burgeoning
political influence, can no longer remain a bystander and allow other nations to
provide for its national security. Pressures from within and without are providing
Japan a context for taking new security initiatives in its defense policy as well as in its
economic policy.
B. DEFENSE POLICY
The post-war security policy of Japan was formulated in the period following its
defeat in World War II, the essence of which is delineated in Article IX of the
Japanese Constitution:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the
Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the
threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of
belligerency of the state will not be recognized. [Ref. 9]
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Because Japan was barred from maintaining "war potential" forces, the question
of assuring it's internal security naturally arose. In July 1950, General Douglas
MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, organized a 75,000-man
paramilitary National Police Reserve (NPR) to settle this question. The NPR replaced
U.S. Army Occupation forces which had been moved to Korea to combat North
Korean troops. In the following year on September 8, 1951, Japan concluded a peace
settlement with the United States. Of particular interest is Chapter Three of the treaty,
entitled, "Security." Though it bound Japan to the peaceful principles of the United
Nations and obligated it to refrain from the use of force in its international relations, it
did recognize that Japan inherently possessed the right of individual or collective
self-defense. [Ref. 28: pp.' 520-21]
As if in response to this particular chapter, the year 1952 also saw the
reorganization of the NPR into the 110,000-man National Safety Force with an added
sea component. Two years later, the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the
Self-Defense Forces Law created the present tri-service Self-Defense Forces (SDF).
The missions of the SDF are clearly outlined in the Self-Defenses Law, which reads:
The primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces shall be to defend the nation
against direct and indirect aggression. . .preserving peace and the independence of
the nation, and if necessary, shall take charge of maintaining public order.
[Ref. 29: p. 16]
During the ensuing years, Japan's defense policy has been influenced by several
significant events. In 1957, Japan adopted the "Basic Policy for National Defense",
which provided the basis for four successive programs to build up Japan's defenses. In
1960, Japan revised its 1954 Mutual Security Treaty with the United States (this will be
discussed in more detail in the following chapter). In 1967, Prime Minister Sato
announced the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" (of not possessing, not producing, and
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not permitting their entry of, nuclear weapons into Japan), and they continue to have a
major impact on Japanese defense policy. With the completion of the fourth Defense
Buildup Program, the Cabinet decided to switch to a National Defense Program
Outline (NDPO) in October 1976. Together with the adoption of the NDPO, the
National Defense Council and Prime Minister Miki decided that annual defense
expenditures would not exceed 1 percent of the GNP of the corresponding fiscal year,
establishing the strictly self-imposed "1 percent ceiling on defense spending" rule.
[Refs. 30,31: pp. 80-81, p. 124]
The annual defense buildup is no longer carried out by five-year buildup
programs but by a five-year "Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate" (called Chugyo in
the Japanese abbreviation) which is reviewed annually. According to the Japan
Defense Agency's (JDA) estimate, only 27 percent of 56 Chugyo would be achieved by
year's end instead of the 40 percent originally planned (see Table 4).
Consequently, in September 1984, the Japanese government decided to draw up a new
five-year plan for the current 59 Chugyo, which covers the 1986-1990 period. [Ref. 32]
The major objectives of the 1986-1990 Medium-Term Defense Plan are:
1. Improving and modernizing air defense, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and
coastal defense capabilities
2. Improving electronic warfare capabilities, sustainability, combat readiness and
invulnerability
3. Improving and modernizing command, communications, logistics support,
education and training [Ref. 33: p. 13]
1. Japan's Self-Defense Forces
The SDF, which have been built up progressively through the four defense
buildup plans and under the NDPO now possess a defense capability that is a far cry
from what it was more than thirty years ago. However, the SDF suffers from a
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TABLE 4
MAJOR PROJECTS OF 56 CHUGYO
i i
Plan to 1 i





Type-74 Tank 373 60 60 120
New 155mm howitzer 175 20 38 58
Anti-Tank Helicopter (AH-1S) 43 5 5 10
Transport Helicopter (CH-47) 16 — 2 2
Equipment for Improved HAWK 3 1 1 2
MSDF I -
DDG 3 j 1 — 1
DD 8 i 1 3 4
DE _ —
Submarine 6 1 1 2
P-3C 50 7 8 15
New Training Support Aircraft 3 — 1 1
ASDF




Transport Helicopter (CH-47) 6 1 1
SOURCE: Defense of Japan, 1984 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1984), p.
141 .
number of deficiencies—its combat capability is greatly reduced by obsolescence and by
a shortage of equipment and facilities. The mainstay of the Air Self-Defense Force's
(ASDF) high-altitude air defense is the Nike-J, but this missile is at least 20 years old
[Ref. 9: p. 99]. For ground defense, most of the 960 tanks in the Ground Self-Defense
Force (GSDF) are Type-61, first deployed in 1962. They are being slowly replaced by
the latest-model Type-74 tanks, but only about 300 have been acquired. Also, more
than half of the 2,830 field guns and rocket launchers are the kind which US forces
used during World War II. [Ref. 34: p. 189]
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Improvements are being made, however, as seen in the July 1982 decision to
deploy 155 F-15s and 75 P-3Cs between 1980 and 1988. Also, the Japanese-made
AStYI-1 air-to-surface missile is supposed to be cheaper and more accurate than the
now-proven capabilities of the Exocet and Harpoon [Ref. 35: pp. 22-23]. Nevertheless,
the Japanese arms buildup, both quantitative and qualitative, is constrained by the
debate in the Diet concerning the offensive or defensive nature of weapons such as the
F-15. Moreover, while there has been growth in quantity of weapons and in the
defense budget, there has been relatively little increase in the size of the SDF (see
Figure 2.1). The manpower targets of all three branches have never been fulfilled-only
90 percent of the authorized number has actually been recruited [Ref. 9: p. 249]. But
the most serious constraint in Japan's defense buildup is the debate over the very
constitutionality of the SDF themselves.
To say that the SDF have been at the center of political controversy is an
understatement. For more than three decades since its inception in 1950, the SDF has
been the target of criticism from the principal opposition party, the Japan Socialist
Party (JSP), with charges that these forces are in violation of the constitution. The
JSP has further characterized the SDF as a tool of American imperialism and as part
of a reactionary plot to restore military rule. At the same time, however, other critics
of the government, ranging from journalists to ultra-rightists, have claimed that these
forces are a militarily inadequate concession to US pressure for rearmament. [Ref. 36:
p. 41]
Despite a number of court rulings (the 1959 Sunakawa case and the 1950
Ashida-Kiyose interpretation) and "emergency legislation" [Ref. 37] to skirt the issue of
the constitutionality of Japan's armed forces, the SDF are "at least extraconstitutional
if not totally unconstitutional" [Ref. 38: p. 78]. The absence of a clearly defined
constitutional framework for the SDF will continue to hamper their further
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(Asof March 31. 1984)





Authorized Number 22.962 9.335 8.888 118 41.303
Actual Number 22,818 9.222 8.792 118 40,950
Manning Rate (%) 99.4 98.8 98.9 100.0 99 1
Warrant officer
Authorized Number 3 491 801 764 5.056
Actual Number 3.484 798 762 5.0-14
Manning Rate ( 0/o) 99.8 996 99 7 998
Enlisted (Upper)
Authorized Number 79,405 22,562 24,863 11 126.841
Actual Number 78,162 21,960 24,768 11 124.901
Manning Rate (%) 98.4 97.3 99 6 100 985
Enhsted (Lower)
Authorized Number 74.142 12,501 12,319 98 962
Actual Number 51.016 11.656 11,410 74,082
Manning Rate (%) 688 93.2 92.6 74.9
Total
Authorized Number 180,000 45.199 46.834 129 272 162
- Actual Number 155,480 43.636 45.732 129 244,977
Manning Rate (%) 86 4 96 5 97 6 100 90
Note: The actual number of SDF personnel does not include persons suspended from duty
Figure 2.1 Authorized and Actual Number of SDF Personnel
development and a "future defense posture will be peculiarly subject to the domestic
political climate" [Ref. 2: p. 21J.
Another serious drawback is that the SDF lack a strategy and a unified
command system for integrated operations between the three branches. The Chiefs of
Staffs of the Air, Ground, and Maritime Self-Defense Forces command the operations
of their respective branches under the direct command of the Prime Minister or the
Defense Minister [Ref. 2: p. 20]. Not only does this result in adequate coordination
among the branches of the SDF in such areas as defense planning, budgeting, and
logistic support, but civilian control in making defense decisions results in delays and
"buck-passing" arising out of the bureaucracy's tendency toward "pronounced
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timidity" and consensus-based decision-making process [Ref. 38: p. 79]. However,
Japan is in the process of trying to overcome some of these deficiencies. For the first
time since its inception, the SDF will hold a major exercise in the summer of 1986,
called INTEGRATED STRATEGIC MANEUVER, involving more than 6,000 troops
and over 1,000 ground vehicles, ships, and aircraft. The MSDF and ASDF will escort
GSDF units from Kyushu to Hokkaido, and will mark the first time the three services'
major units will operate jointly in an exercise on a nation-wide scale. [Ref. 39: p. 688]
2. Defense Expenditures
The most obvious link between defense and economics is Japan's ability-and
willingness—to buy military equipment and enlarge its defense capabilities. The
Self-Defense Forces have been the single customer for Japan's defense some of which,
such as the aircraft and ammunition-arms industries, are highly dependent on defense
production. Some 80 percent of the aircraft industry and almost all of the
ammunition-arms industry depend on defense contracts for their livelihood.
Consequently, the orders which the defense industries receive depend on the scope of
the national defense budget.
According to Japan's Defense Agency (JDA), the size of Japan's defense
budget ranks it 8th in the world, yet the nation has a modest level of defense spending
in regard to the United States and the NATO allies-it is less than 1 percent of GNP.
In December 1985, the Nakasone cabinet approved a $267.8 billion budget for fiscal
1986 that included a 6.58 percent gain in defense spending. This increase in the defense
budget raises the previous year's budget of about $13 billion to almost $16.5 billion,
and is expected to correspond to 0.993 percent of Japan's GNP for 1986. [Ref. 40]
Although the defense budget is still less than 1 percent of the GNP, fiscal 1986
will mark the beginning of a government-approved 5-year defense buildup plan
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(1986-1990) with planned expenditures of over S91 billion, wherein these defense
appropriations will be 1.038 percent of the GNP currently projected for those five years
[Ref. 41J. Table 5 graphically illustrates the marked disparity of defense spending
between Japan, the USSR, and Europe, while Table 6 compares Japan's per capita




RATIO OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE TO GNP (°/c GNP), SELECTED
COUNTRIES
1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983
USSR 11. 8.4 12.0 15.0 17. 0* 17. 1*
USA 7. 8 5.8 5.7 6. 1 6. 5 7. 4
Britain 4. 9 4.9 5.1 5. 3 5. 3 5. 5
France 4. 3. 9 3.9 4. 1 4. 2 4. 2
Germany 3. 3 3.7 3.2 4. 1 4. 1 3. 4
Japan 0. 8 0. 9 0. 9 0. 9 0. 9 0. 9
* No precise figures are available, but some Western estimates range from
10-20 percent.
SOURCE: The Military Balance, 1985-1986.
The factors in the call for removing the 1 percent limitation were stated
previously as a result of the aggravation of international tensions caused by such
developments as the USSR's increased deployment of its forces in East Asia, the Soviet
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TABLE 6
COMPARISON OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURE AND MILITARY
MANPOWER, 1978-1983











88 87 98 241 245 243
87 112 132 601 622 598
-- -- -- 4450 4000 3900
75 92 103 678 785 838
178 189 174 438 484 440
632 846 1023 2050 2136 2152
^Chinese figures are not comparable to Western estimates, nor are Beijing's
pricing practices known in detail.
SOURCE: The Military Balance, 1985-1986.
invasion of Afghanistan, and pressure from the US government for building up Japan's
SDF. Additionally, the Reagan Administration's call for a beefing up of Japan's
defense capability in order to defend its sea lanes has given strength to the argument
for breaching the 1 percent ceiling. The principle of keeping defense expenditures to
less than 1 percent of the GNP was decided by the Miki Cabinet in 1976— it is not a
constitutional limitation. Defense spending had been higher than this recent
self-imposed ceiling from 1950 to 1953 when it was a little over 3 percent of GNP, and
again in 1954-55 when it went over 2 percent. [Ref. 42: p. 295]
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Although the economics of defense matters have put a damper on substantial
increases for Japan's military forces, there are signs which point to the inevitability of a
more realistic goal. Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro and Tanaka Rokusuke (chairman
of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council) have been quoted to say that defense
spending cannot be kept within 1 percent of the GNP forever. In actually, if NATO's
accounting methods, which include pension funds, were used the defense expenditure
would represent about 1.5 percent of the GNP. [Ref. 43] Whether annual defense
spending will actually exceed the 1 percent ceiling will be determined by the growth of
Japan's economy, but at current estimates, a 4 percent annual growth rate would in
turn raise projected defense outlays to approximately 1.04 percent of the GNP. If
these estimates run true, the Ministry of Defense will be obliged to boost the defense
budget by an average of 7-9 percent each year of the five-year term, which translates to
an actual increase of 1.9 percent over the level exhibited the past three years. [Ref. 41]
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III. JAPAN'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES
For more than thirty-five years following World War II, the US-Japan
relationship has been the anchor of America's economic and security presence in Asia.
Indeed, this relationship has critical importance for the political, economic, and
security interests of both the United States and Japan, as well as the preservation of
peace, security, and stability for the rest of Asia.
On the whole, the relationship has been a close and remarkably successful one,
with each side recognizing the vital interest it has in keeping strong ties with the other.
However, it also has been characterized by misperceptions and imbalances. Though
there have been frictions which have given rise to frustrations and bitterness on both
sides, they have never seriously threatened the relationship. Some have attributed
these difficulties as a result of a communications or information gap, while others have
described the source of friction has an expectations gap in which "the perceptions of
two nations have of their respective roles, as well as the expectations each has of its
partner, are at variance with each other" [Ref. 44: p. 694].
Given the importance of the relationship and the occasionally recurring doubts
about its future, the need for better communication between Japan and the United
States is readily apparent. If both Japan and the US desire to lay the conceptual
framework for security policies that will carry through the 1980s and into the next
decade, it is paramount that the United States make every attempt to gain further
insight into Japanese views on their own security. Japan, for its part, must come to
understand more clearly the American purposes, expectations, and limitations.
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A. THE US-JAPAN ALLIANCE
The evolution of Japan-United States relations in the postwar era- has been a
complicated, but highly interesting story of transition from a conqueror-conquered to
patron-client to a more equal, but not quite adequately balanced relationship. A
central component of that relationship has been the security treaty concluded
immediately after the peace treaty with Japan was signed at the San Francisco peace
conference of 1951. Support for the security remains high in both countries and the
security relationship has become broader and more cooperative.
Traditionally, the relationship between the United States and Japan has centered
around economic matters. The problems with the continuing trade "imbalance" have
been well-publicized, and charges of unfair marketing practices and threats of
retaliatory protectionism have almost become daily news items. However, it has only
been in recent years that the security aspect, and Japan's contribution to the security
relationship, have come under close scrutiny. Consequently, pressure has been
mounting for Japan to do more. More vocal critics of Japan's defense policy have
repeatedly accused Japan of taking a free ride on defense costs by way of the US-Japan
Alliance while building up economic power at home through a policy of ever-expanding
exports. [Ref. 45: p. 1]
Much of the criticism of Japan's defense policies stems from the economic
problems between the two countries, notably the huge trade deficit suffered by the US.
It seems that the larger the US trade deficit with Japan grows, the "louder American
business and political leaders complain that Japan is fattening its prosperity by leaving
its defense to the American taxpayer" [Ref. 46: p.l 14].
Though it may not seem fair nor logical, two entirely different issues, trade and
defense, have been linked to further complicate the security relationship between Japan
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and the United States. American critics point out that while the United States has
been spending close to 6 percent of its GNP annually for defense and the European
allies whose defense budgets amount to an average of 3 to 5 percent, Japan spends just
below 1 percent of its GNP for defense. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, this
1
-percent ceiling has no legal basis but it has become a widely accepted restriction of
successive governments. The Japanese failure to increase defense spending beyond the
1 percent level does not necessarily mean that Japan's defense budget has not been
growing at a fairly high annual rate, nor does it mean that the Japanese have not
become relatively more conscious of defense during the past decade. As Table 7
indicates, Japan's defense spending record, for example, shows an average increase of
between 5 and 7 percent annually.
The first step taken by Japan and the United States in creating an alliance
between the two nations was formalized in the signing of the Treaty of Peace on
September 8, 1951. This treaty restored to the Japanese full sovereignty over Japan
and its territorial waters [Ref. 47: p. 3169]. On the same day that Japan signed the
Treaty of Peace, it also entered into a security treaty with the United States [Ref. 48: p.
3329]. This Security Treaty of 1951 essentially maintained that the United States
would come to defend Japan if the latter was attacked. In the words of the treaty:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories
under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety and it declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional provisions and processes. [Ref. 48: p. 3330]
Even as early as this stage in the security arrangement, the United States began
applying pressure on Japan for a sharing of the defense burden. Then Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles pressed the Japanese for a commitment to rearmament so
that they would make a contribution to the regional security of East Asia. The
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TABLE 7
TRENDS IN LEVEL AND SHARE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE
EXPENDITURES (FY 1955-1 985)
Defense
Expenditures*
(Yen, in billions) % Change <% GNP**
1955 134. 9 -3. 3 1. 78
1960 156. 9 0. 6 1. 23
1965 301. 4 9. 6 1. 07
1970 569. 5 17. 7 0. 79
1975 1327.
3
21. 4 0. 84
1980 1901. 10. 2 0. 90
1983 2754. 2 6. 5 0. 98
1984 2934. 6 6. 5 0. 99
1985 3137. 1 6. 9 0. 99
^Initial budget.
**GNP figures are government estimates made for budget comparison
purposes.
SOURCE: Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs, Japan 1985, an
International Comparison (Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, 1985), p. 86.
Japanese naturally rejected this proposal, with General MacArthur supporting their
position. Dulles reached a compromise by working into the preamble of the security
treaty a future commitment to defense. As a result, the preamble provided for a
provisional arrangement with the United States maintaining armed forces in Japan, and
in the expectation that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for its own
defense against direct and indirect aggression. [Ref. 45: p. 9]
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Although the MST is the cornerstone of Japan's defense policy in Asia, and in
spite of the US promise to come to the aid of Japan in case of an attack, many
Japanese had regarded the 1952 treaty as an unequal one and felt that many of the
provisions in it were adverse to their national interests. Two years after the signing of
the Peace and Securities treaties, the United States and Japan concluded a Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement on March 8, 1954. The purpose of this agreement was
to establish a legal basis for the furnishing of military equipment and technology to
Japan. [Ref. 49: p. 661] The 1951 treaty was subjected to broad and continued
criticism in Japan by both the political opposition and the press. The United States,
for its part, continued its pressure for a Japanese commitment to share in the defense
of East Asia and the western Pacific, to include Guam. On January 19, 1960, the
United States and Japan signed the revised Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
[Ref. 50: pp. 26-27].
Although the treaty of June 1960 made the security relations more acceptable to
Japan by allowing it to have more say over the US defense posture, there were a few
legal obligations that Japan had to assume under the new treaty:
(a) Japan agreed, subject to constitutional limitations, to maintain and develop its
capacity to resist armed attack
(b) Japan agreed to consult with the United States whenever the security of Japan
or international peace and security of the East Asia is threatened
(c) Japan agreed to act to meet the common danger in the event of an armed attack
against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan
(d) Japan agreed to provide facilities and areas for the use of US Armed Forces for
the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and maintaining peace and
security in East Asia [Ref. 51: p. 1632]
Two other significant agreements were concluded on the same date that the
United States and Japan executed the revised treaty. One consisted of an exchange of
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notes concerning implementation of article VI of the security treaty. These notes
established the requirement for the United States to agree to consulting with Japanese
authorities prior to any major movement of US troops and arms into or out of Japan,
or of major changes in equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases
for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan (other than those
conducted for the direct defense of Japan). [Ref. 51: pp. 1646-47]
This requirement for prior consultation, in effect, gave Japan a veto over US
troop deployments, choice of weapons, and combat operations outside Japan. But
even under this new treaty, the unilateral nature of the alliance remained
unchanged—Japan still had no obligations beyond self-defense to come to the aid of the
United States in case of an attack. [Ref. 52: p. 36]
B. BURDEN SHARING
No issue in the US-Japan security relationship has been more salient than the
issue of sharing the cost of the defense burden. The United States, beset with
economic problems at home and with resources strained to a near-breaking point to
meet its global commitments, has become more vocal and forceful in urging Japan to
increase both its defense spending and military capabilities in order to assume more
responsibility for its own defense and for the regional security of Asia.
The durability of the US-Japan alliance can be attributed mainly to two
factors-a relatively benign international security environment for Japan and the
dominance of the domestic political forces, pacifistic in nature and committed to a
limited defense capability within the framework of its close military relationship with
the United States [Ref. 53: p. 9]. However, the international situation has changed,
and the US no longer enjoys an unequivocal military superiority over the Soviet Union,
especially in the Pacific. To meet the threat posed by a growing Soviet Navy in this
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area, the United States has embarked on a program to realize a 600-ship Navy
[Ref. 54: pp. 30-40]. Because of the Soviet threat and the resultant strain on the US
defense budget in meeting this threat, Washington has asked its major ally in the
Pacific to shoulder more of its own defense and thus relieve some of the burden of the
United States. The idea of burden sharing has been a main security dispute between
the two countries but it appears that a solution is on the way. After years of criticism,
previous complaints about the inadequacies of Japanese defense spending have been
replaced by praise by Washington for Japan's steady buildup and the growing military
ties between the two countries [Ref. 55].
The Japanese are making substantial contributions to the overall security picture
in the Asia-Pacific. For example, they provide strategically important military bases
for US forces--Yokota, Iwakuni, Misawa, and Kadena airbases; Yokosuka and Atsugi
naval bases; Camp Zama and Camp Courtney, just a few of the 118 facilities available
to the US military. Financially, the Japanese government contributes more than SI
billion annually to support the costs of these US forces which number around
46,000—about $21,000 per US serviceman. By comparison, West Germany contributes
about S5,400, only one-fourth of that amount. [Ref. 56]
US requests for mutual exchanges of dual-use technologies are expanding the
dimension of Tokyo's cooperation with Washington. Japan is now meeting concerns
about the flow of Japanese defense-related or dual-purpose technology to the United
States. A diplomatic exchange of notes in November 1983 formalized the Japanese
agreement made earlier in January to make a particular exception of the US from its
strict arms exports ban. [Ref. 57]
The agreement essentially opened the door for Japanese companies and the JDA
to sell or license military technology to the private sector in the U.S. and the Pentagon.
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According to the American viewpoint, allowing Japanese military technology to be
exported to the U.S. would demonstrate Japan's commitment of the bilateral alliance
and would strengthen the overall security relationship. Furthermore, the 1954 Mutual
Defense Assistance Agreement had stipulated that each government would make
available to the other equipment, materials, services or other aid, as authorized by the
government furnishing them. [Ref. 49: p. 661]
C. THREAT PERCEPTIONS
When the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security went into effect, the
United States was the dominant military power in Northeast Asia, with marked
superiority over the USSR and the PRC in both strategic and nuclear weapon systems,
naval forces, and air power. With the United States fully capable of guaranteeing
Japan's security against either spectrum of threats, there was no need to define a
precise role for Japanese military forces until now [Ref. 58: p. 325]. However, what
was politically convenient for the 1960s is no longer applicable with the realities of the
1980s. Among those realities are the shifts in the US-USSR strategic nuclear balance,
and the differences in Japanese and American perceptions of the threat posed by Soviet
military forces.
1 . The Japanese Perception of Defense Issues
A major reason for Japan's reluctance to assume a greater role in its
self-defense has been the nature of the Japanese external threat perceptions. Outlining
the Japanese perception of the Soviet threat can be a risky business since viewpoints
vary widely among the many defense, political, economic, and university sectors in
Japan. Although Japanese threat perception is not monolithic by any means, several
themes run common among the various elite.
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A dominant theme is the nature of the Soviet threat in Asia. The United
States and Japan do not disagree over the static facts of the military balance in Asia.
The real difference lies in the fact that Japan takes into account only the actual
military capabilities while the United States considers the intentions of the enemy as
well.
In addition, despite the Soviet buildup, there are many Japanese who sincerely
believe that a military conflict will not take place in Japan's neighborhood. The
Japanese have difficulty in developing scenarios involving direct military threats to
their own security. Their concern tends to focus on indirect threats, such as a spillover
effect of local conflicts (for instance, in Korea) on the approaches to, or along, the
supply routes leading to the home islands. [Ref. 59: p. 81] This complacent attitude
toward security is best summarized in the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)
which was outlined in October 1976 by the National Defense Council and the Cabinet.
Current Japanese security policy, as stated in the NDPO, are based on the following
assumptions:
(a) There is little possibility of a full-scale military clash between East & West or of
any major conflict leading to such a clash
(b) There is little possibility of limited military conflict breaking out in Japan's
neighborhood
(c) The US-Japan security arrangements can prevent full-scale agression against
Japan [Ref. 60: p. 180]
Another theme is the fear that the military alliance with the United States is
more likely to ensnare Japan into a war than is the Soviet military potential. On the
other hand, there is also the belief that because of Japan's critical geostrategic position,
Tokyo would still become entangled in the superpower conflict even if it decided to
remain neutral:
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Although leftists in Japan argue that it may be involved in a war because of the
existence of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty and of the U.S. bases in Japan, in
fact it is threatened not because of its military alliance but because of its
geostrategic situation. It would be unreasonable not to expect a major power to
attempt to seize a geostrategically important area before its opponent utilizes it,
particularly if the country at issue were inadequately armed. [Ref. 61: p. 191]
Finally, there is the popular belief that the United States will continue to
"behave responsibly toward Japan no matter how irresponsible Tokyo behaves toward
Washington" [Ref. 60: p. 277]. The key point in understanding the Japanese stance on
defense issues is that as long as US global policies and capabilities retain credibility in
Japanese eyes, direct Soviet military threats against Japan will appear unlikely and
ineffective [Ref. 59: p. 80].
2. The American Perception of Defense Issues
The main cause for friction from the American perspective vis-a-vis the
growing Soviet threat in Asia, is that Japan, with its tremendous economic power, is
not doing enough to share the load largely borne by the United States. Many
Americans resent Japan's presumed "free ride" in defense matters, believing that it is
too slow in taking a more serious attitude toward the Soviet threat.
Another difference in the "perception gap" has been the perspective from
which the US has viewed the defense of Japan. The United States has seen and
continues to see defense arrangements in a global context while Japan takes a
narrower, more regional view [Ref. 30: p. 84]. From the American side, the growing
strength of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) and the Pacific Fleet threaten not only Japan
but also US forces deployed near there which would be used for defending Japan. In
addition to this threat against both Japan and the US, military strategists further
contend that there are five basic threats to Japan's security: nuclear attack;
conventional air attack; amphibious attack; attacks on the sea lanes; and attacks on
distant areas on which Japan is dependent, e.g. the Persian Gulf [Ref. 62: p. 41].
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The United States would like to see its partner in Asia regard the Soviet threat
not just as a potential one, but as a direct and realistic one as well. An
accomplishment of this goal would soon pave the way towards better relations between
the two countries.
D. OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE
The challenge facing the United States is to work with the complexity of
Japanese defense diffidence and economic strength to formulate a coordinated set of
foreign and domestic defense policies that are properly aligned with both Japanese and
American interests. If the two countries cannot redefine their security relationship to
mutual satisfaction and come up with improved methods for consultation between
them, there is a good possibility that a "political spillover that could seriously erode a
relationship that since World War II has been fundamental to America's presence in
Asia. . ." [Ref. 63: p. 708]. Given the importance of the relationship and the
uncertainty about its future, the need for better communication between Japan and the
United States is essential. Whatever course the future of Japan-US relations may take,
it is paramount that each country clearly understands the assumptions and goals which
motivate the security policies of the other.
Perhaps the most effective approach to building a productive partnership
reflecting Japan's enhanced capabilities, responsibilities, and aspirations should be on
of the United States privately pressuring for steady improvements in Japanese military
capabilities. These improvements should be commensurate with existing threats to
Japan's security, and not ignore the economic and political limitations which challenge
the Japanese government either.
If Japan is to continue to depend on its security from the American umbrella and
from the US military presence there, it must be more willing to share a larger share of
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the related cost. The crucial element in this argument centers more on the pace, and
not the quantity of the Japanese contribution. For military (and economic) reasons,
the United States has been urging Japan to strengthen its defenses at a more rapid
pace. In view of the continuing efforts the Japanese government has been able to
place on the qualitative buildup of Japan's defense forces, it does not seem unlikely
that the arbitrary barrier on defense spending will be breached. Steady, significant
increases in defense spending could substantially enhance the quality of Japanese
military forces, and thereby lessen some of the load for US military requirements in
and around Japan.
But before Japan can embark on the road for an expanded role in the defense of
the region, it must overcome the main obstacle which bars its way; that obstacle is
Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution. This article forbids all activities for
collective security outside Japan's own territory, and as long as it remains unamended,
it is highly unlikely that a multi-national alliance would be formed.
Although it may be a sensitive and unpopular issue, both the United States and
Japan should openly and realistically consider the question of revising the present
security treaty. Currently, the US is playing the role of Japan's "protector", while for
Japan, there is no obligation to "defend even US ships on the high seas surrounding
Japan" [Ref. 64: p. 837]. The unilateral nature of the treaty could be the rallying cry of
those who claim that Japan is getting a "free ride" from the United States, which could
foster the seeds of more acrimonious arguments in the future. There is, however, an
alternative to revising the Security Treaty—Japan can continue to contribute to the
interests of the Western world by exerting greater efforts in strengthening its own
defense postures, beginning with fulfilling those defense goals stated in its NDPO.
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Another possibility would be to fashion a security arrangement based on
cooperation with the PRC and other nations that might be associated. The obvious
drawback to this option is that such an arrangement would be viewed as highly
threatening by the USSR and other nations already suspicious of China's intents in the
region. [Ref. 65: p. 406]
Japanese acceptance of the importance of revising the security treaty will, in all
likelihood, be long in coming, but that does not mean there should not be any efforts
made in that direction. One recommendation which I share with the Japan Center for
the Study of Security Issues (JCSSI) is for the US government to
"tactfully.
. .encourage Japan to accelerate the national movement toward this
fundamental change in security relationships" [Ref. 42: pp. 297-98].
The US policy vis-a-vis the Western Alliance is basically a coalition strategy
based on a proper division of labor between the US and its allies. The MST goes
against this basic philosophy of the United States. With Japan's expanded economic
power, both the United States and Japan should concentrate on making greater
concerted efforts to at least retain, and hopefully, improve the deterrent ability of the
MST.
At a time when many areas in the world are troubled, and with alliances being
strained by political as well as economic problems, the US-Japan relationship takes on
even more critical importance for the political, economic, and security interests of these
two countries. A healthy and productive association between them could in many
ways contribute to the security and economic growth of the entire Asian- Pacific region.
The challenge of the future is to realize the full potential of the relationship between
Japan and the United States. No longer is the US relationship with Japan a bilateral
one-it has now taken on global dimensions. As Japan moves toward an expanded and
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more active international role, the US must ensure that Japan's economic,
technological, and eventual military policies be compatible with its own foreign policy
objectives.
Japan has shown its willingness to cooperate with the United States by
promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula, increasing food assistance to Africa,
restricting the flow of high technology to the Soviet bloc, promoting world economic
development, and working to de-escalate conflict in the Middle East. Nevertheless,
Japan needs to do more to dispel its image as a "free-rider". If Tokyo truly desires to
be regarded as an equal partner in its alliance with the United States, Japan should be
prepared to provide as much for the US as Washington is prepared to do for Japan.
This would entail not only being more responsible for its own defense but a willingness
on Japan's part to share equally in regional defense programs. In his discussion on
US-Japan reciprocity at a Pacific forum in Stanford, California, Dr. Edward A. Olsen
summed up the issue neatly:
The United States and Japan ought to talk about what needs to be done, not
about expenditure of a certain percentage of the GNP. . . Japan's capabilities
should be measured not only in terms of forces in the field but also in terms of its
ability to pay for regional defense. If the United States can spend approximately
S45 billion of its defense budget for the Pacific Basin, Japan should quadruple its
budget commitments for the same security purposes. JRef. 3: p. 197]
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IV. JAPAN-USSR RELATIONS
Post-war relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have evolved around
Japan's alliance with the United States and have followed a haphazard course at best.
The normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1956 was in
turn followed by a harsh Soviet attack on Japan for its signing the US-Japan Security
Treaty of 1960. The Soviet Union went so far as to dangle a political carrot by
pledging to restore the Habomai group and Shikotan island to Japan, conditional
upon the abrogation of the treaty with the US [Ref. 66]
Although the Soviet Union has become more interested in Japan, certain political
issues remain unsolved, thereby causing strains in Japanese-Soviet relations.
Moreover, Japan is uneasy over the rapid military developments which have taken
place in Northeast Asia. At the same time, however, the Soviet Union is quite
conscious of the fact that it is surrounded by Japan, the United States, the People's
Republic of China, and various NATO countries. Consequently, it claims that it
cannot feel secure unless it maintains and strengthens its military capability, to include
keeping "its international boundaries as geographically extended as possible." [Ref. 67:
p. 25] While it has served Moscow's interests in the past to portray Japan as the
forward base of "imperialism" in Asia and as part of a tacit anti-Soviet triangle to
justify its own claims to play a military and political role in Asia, the failure of this
policy has become more readily apparent in recent years. There has been a growing
sense of security cooperation among Asian states which many analysts attribute to
fears of the increased Soviet military presence in the Asian-Pacific region [Ref. 68: p.
27]. With Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's visit to Japan in January 1986,
Moscow has sent out signals that its policy of "distance" toward East Asia is over.
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Why the sudden interest in renewing political ties with Asia? Perhaps Moscow
senses an opportunity for driving a wedge between the US and its Asian allies,
capitalizing on the frictions related to trade. The Soviets are concerned about the
increasing linkages between Japan and the US in such matters as computers and
defense-related technology-areas that have adverse military implications for the Soviet
Union, and they will do what is necessary to discourage the development of those
linkages. Whether Moscow's new approach to Japan is primarily aimed at dividing
Japan from the United States remains to be seen. What is clearly evident, though, is
the fact that Premier Gorbachev's attempts to give a new impetus to Soviet diplomacy
in Asia conveyed his intention to "treat Japan more as a sovereign power and no
longer as an American client" [Ref. 68: p. 27].
A. JAPANESE-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Despite the differences in their socio-economic systems, the geographical
proximity of Japan and the Soviet Union encourages the development of economic and
trade relations between them. More importantly, though, is that the structure of trade
activities and the nature of trade commodities between the two countries seem to be
mutually supplementary and beneficial. [Ref. 69: p. 5] As a result, the complementarity
of the two economic structures theoretically make Japan and the USSR ideal trading
partners. The Soviet Union needs Japan's capital, technology, and consumer goods,
while Japan needs the other's natural resources such as oil, gas, coal, iron ores, and
timber. Consequently, the Soviets consistently stress this factor of economic
complementarity when discussing the potential for increased trade with Japan (see
Table 8).
The character of economic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union is best
illustrated by the history of Siberian development projects. The Japanese experience in
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SOURCE: Ministry of Finance, as cited
December 26, 1985, p. 51.
in Far Eastern Economic Review,
Siberian development is more than two decades old and has involved over S3 billion in
loans and credit. When these Siberian projects were launched in the mid-1960s, the
outlook shared by both Japan and the USSR was promising. But by the 1970s,
Japanese enthusiasm for such activities decreased substantially for reasons which will
be discussed later. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent renewal of
East-West tensions added to a stalemate in development projects.
Cooperation in the economic field began in 1965 with the formation of a
semi-official Japanese-Soviet Economic Committee which gave birth to various
cooperative ventures:
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(1) Development of forest resources (1968)
(2) Port and transport facilities construction at Vrangel and Vostochnyi (1970 and
1977)
(3) Wood chips and pulp development (1971)
(4) Paper and pulp production (1973)
(5) Yakutia coking coal and iron ore development (1968)
(6) Energy-related projects: Yakutia natural gas (1974), Sakhalin oil and natural
gas (1975), Tyumen oil development (1972) [Refs. 70,69: pp. 5-15, pp. 10-12]
Of the various projects listed above, only four-two timber projects, the Vrangel
port construction, and the wood chips project-have been completed. One of the
reasons for non-completion of the remaining projects was due to constant changes of
conditions made by the Soviets. Another was the poor profitability of some of the
projects, while a related reason was over-competition by Japanese companies. Finally,
the difficulties encountered in Siberian development led Japanese businesses to seek a
potentially more massive market in China, a market with fewer frictions than in the
Soviet one. [Ref. 71: pp. 203-207]
In addition to the above reasons, which are mainly economic in nature, another
factor that contributed to a standstill in Japanese-Soviet economic relations was
politically motivated. In November 1979 the Afghanistan invasion, and two years
later, the Poland Crisis (December 1981) occurred. Following the lead of the United
States, Japan, along with several other Western nations, adopted economic sanctions
against the Soviet Union by strengthening the conditions on the Japan Export-Import
Bank's loans for the Soviet Union and by imposing a ban on official-level trade
contacts between the two countries [Ref. 69: pp. 35-36]. As a result of those economic
sanctions, and Japanese-Soviet bilateral trade declined from about $5.3 billion in 1981,
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rising to a high of $5.6 billion in the following year, and dropping to a low of $2 billion
in 1985 [Ref. 72: p. 30].
Nevertheless, the chill in trade relations between Japan and the USSR, was
noticeably warmed up by Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to
Japan in January 1986. The new mood in that relationship, though played up by both
Soviet and Japanese news media throughout the days preceding Shevardnadze's visit,
actually dates back to the close of 1984 when the Japanese Foreign Ministry withdrew
its ban on official-level trade contacts as part of a campaign to normalize the
long-stalled political relationship between the two countries. This action resulted in a
meeting of the Japanese-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee in December 1984,
the first in five years [Ref. 73: p. 8].
This meeting brought immediate results in the form of some $140 million worth
of orders for Japanese construction machinery and machine tool manufacturers, an
unfreezing of Japan's Exim Bank loans to the USSR, and Soviet orders for Japanese
electronic goods. More importantly, though, was the renewed interest in fulfilling
several of the stalled Siberian development projects. In March 1985, Japan agreed to
sign a one-year contract for the import of coking coal from Yakutia. In December
1985, a major break-through occurred when the two sides signed a long-term contract
for the production and shipment of wood pulp and chips. In addition, discussions have
once again taken place over the possible start of development work on the continental
shelf of Sakhalin Island. [Refs. 74,75: pp. 1 & 15, p. CI]
The realization of cooperative projects for Siberian development could constitute
an important element in Japanese-Soviet economic relations and could also become
one of the most decisive factors in the possible future expansion of trade between the
two countries. Massive developmental projects in Siberia could result in demands for
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equipment, industrial materials, and consumer products, presenting Japan with great
export opportunities. However, the resumption of some stalled joint-development
projects in Siberia in the near future does not constitute a guarantee that
Japanese-Soviet economic relations will be back to the level it was in the early 1970s
when both countries enjoyed a seemingly complementary economic relationship.
Japanese trade officials still anticipate difficulties over the coming years in keeping the
bilateral trade balance within reasonable limits. [Ref. 72: p. 32]
While the quantity of Japanese exports to the Soviet Union rose dramatically
after the December 1984 meeting, the USSR has yet to reciprocate by upping its level
of exports to Japan. With the exception of energy products which comprise 75 percent
of the Soviet Union's exports to Western countries, there are simply not enough Soviet
products to balance the accounts against Japan's potentially overwhelming exports of
steel, chemicals, and machinery. Consequently, this results in increasing the large trade
surplus already in Japan's favor. Moreover, Japanese trade officials remain highly
critical about Soviet slowness and inefficiency, both at the negotiating table and in the
implementation of the projects which the two countries have decided to undertake.
[Ref. 72: p. 30]
In spite of the renewed emphasis and vigor Moscow is showing in its Asian
foreign policy, it appears to have made minimal progress to date in upgrading the value
of Soviet exports through additional processing. Moreover, the Soviet Union has not
shown much interest in establishing manufacturing industries specifically aimed at
exports on the country which many of Asia's newly industrialized countries (NICs)
model themselves. [Ref. 72: p. 30] For both Japan and the Soviet Union, the object of
these renewed efforts in developing Siberia is no doubt economic. At the same time,
however, the resumption of stalled-joint development projects in Siberia raises
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far-reaching strategic and political concerns, such as the strengthening of Siberian
transportation systems, the transfer of Western technology, the production of raw
materials such as oil, and the boost it will give to the Soviet Union's increased foreign
exchange earnings. Siberia offers the Soviet Union a strategic depth for the dispersed
location of its population, key military industries, and the majority of its
intercontinental ballistic missile silos. The Kamchatka Peninsula, the Sea of Okhotsk,
and the adjacent Kurile Islands have been developed into major Soviet air, naval,
submarine, and radar bases with a substantial impact on the East-West military
balance in East Asia and the Pacific [Ref. 76: p. 4]. Since Japan has had a recent
history of not regarding the Soviet Union as an immediate threat to its national
security, it should proceed cautiously in its economic endeavors with that country.
Japan should at least develop those projects that will not provide the Soviets with an
infrastructural base which could be used for future military build-ups in Pacific Siberia.
The potential for future economic growth is great, especially if the two countries
can overcome their differences regarding Japanese participation in joint development
projects in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The USSR could become an even more
important source of raw materials and energy needed by Japan—strong incentives for
broadened Japanese economic activities to accelerate the development of these Soviet
eastern territories. Furthermore, non-economic ties have also been on the rise, as
evidenced by the increase in visits by government leaders both countries and trips by
Japanese businessmen. Nevertheless, in spite of these promising signs, Japanese-Soviet
relations continue to be beset by unsolved bilateral problems and by mutual mistrust of
the other's intentions and future respective roles in East Asia.
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B. THE POLITICAL ARENA
Japan's post-war economic policy, particularly vis-a-vis Eastern-bloc countries,
has generally been characterized by seikei bunri, or the separation of economic issues
from politics. In the case of Japan's relations with the USSR, however, Japanese
political leaders have closely linked economics with political relations. On the other
hand, business leaders from Japan's private sector have advocated the policy of seikei
bunri. For example, at the time of the Afghanistan invasion, Nagano Shigeo, chairman
of the Japan-Soviet Business Cooperation Committee, criticized the government for
confusing political and economic issues. He also suggested that the territorial issue be
shelved for five to ten years and, while in the interim, continue with Siberian
development projects [Ref. 71: pp. 210]. The Japanese government has been cautious,
however, maintaining the position that stable political relations, in particular, the
settlement of the territorial issue, are the preconditions for increased economic
relations.
Seikei bunri once again manifested itself in Soviet Foreign Minister
Shevardnadze's visit to Tokyo in January 1986. It was the first high-level visit in
nearly a decade and it represented a thaw in Japan-USSR relations. However, while
some progress was made on the economic front in the form of agreements to upgrade
trade and economic discussions, very little was made in the political arena. The
question of the Northern Territories continued to be a major stumbling block in
bettering Japanese-Soviet political relations. The two sides remained deeply divided
over Soviet occupation of the four northern islands ofT Hokkaido.
Three factors in Japanese domestic politics are particularly important for
Japan-USSR relations: (1) the traditionally negative attitude of the Japanese toward
the Soviet Union, (2) the absence of a peace treaty between the two countries, and (3)
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the still unsolved territorial dispute regarding ownership of the Kurile Islands.
Throughout much of Japan's modern history the USSR has been regarded as a
menacing neighbor, a challenge to the nation's security, if not an enemy in war. In
fact, the Soviet Union and Japan are still technically at war. Although the two
countries normalized diplomatic relations in 1956, Japan has refused to sign a peace
treaty formally ending hostilities until the Soviet Union returns the four small islands
off the coast of Hokkaido. The USSR is the only country in the world not to have
concluded a peace treaty with Japan after World War II. [Ref. 77]
Soviet actions since 1945 have done little to improve these images of a hostile
neighbor. In the last days of the war, Moscow unilaterally broke a nonagression treaty
to participate in the last days of the Pacific War, incarcerated nearly 2 million Japanese
soldiers and civilians, and sent hundreds of thousands to Siberian labor camps.
Japanese fishing in the northern seas near the Soviet coast has been restricted and
harassed, and all territorial claims have been rejected. Understandably, the Soviet
Union has consistently ranked as the most disliked country in opinion polls throughout
the postwar period [Ref. 17: p. 180]. Recent public opinion polls indicate the Japanese
still have a distrust of the USSR, fed in recent years by incidents such as the downing
of a Korean airliner by Soviet fighters, the detection of Soviet nuclear submarines in
Japanese waters, military intrusions into Japan's airspace and numerous espionage
cases (see Figure 4.1) [Ref. 77].
A central issue which continues to stymie a warming trend in Japanese-Soviet
relations is the territorial dispute over the southern Kurile Islands (see Figure 4.2).
The Soviet Union has consistently maintained that there is no territorial problem
between Japan and the USSR, and that the outcome of World War II cannot be
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Figure 4.2 The Northern Territories
military victory in World War II, this sovereignty has not been recognized nor legalized
by an international accord [Ref. 78: p. 28].
In the Japanese view, the two islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu, illegally seized
and occupied by the Soviets after World War II, have always been under Japanese
control. Moreover, these islands should by no means be included in the area which
Japan has taken by 'violence and greed' as delineated in the Cairo Declaration of
November 27, 1943 [Ref. 66: p. 13]. Although the provisions of the Yalta Agreement
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provided that Japan should turn over the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union, and the
provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty stipulated that Japan should renounce all
right, title, and claim to the Kuriles, none of the provisions gave a clear definition of
what the Kuriles were. This is further complicated by the fact that in two former
treaties with Russia, the islands had been defined as excluding both Kunashiri and
Etorofu. The two treaties are the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation
(1855), also known as the Shimoda Pact, and the Treaty For the Exchange of Sakhalin
For the Kuriles (1875). In the words of the Shimoda Pact:
. . .henceforth the boundary line between Japan and Russia shall be a line
drawn between "Etorofu" and "Urup" islands. The entire island of Etorofu
belongs to Japan, while the entire island of Urup and the Kurile islands to the
north of Urup belong to Russia. In regard to Sakhalin island there shall be no
boundary line and past practices shall be observed. [Ref. 79: p. 20]
In the second treaty, Japan relinquished all rights to Sakhalin in exchange for the
Kurile Islands:
In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the island of Sakhalin, as
mentioned in Article I, His Majesty the emperor of all Russia on behalf of
Himself and his Heirs, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, the group of
islands known as the Kuriles, which He now possesses, together with all the
rights of sovereignty derived from this possession, so that henceforth the said
group of the Kurile shall belong to the Empire of Japan. [Ref. 80: p. 19]
The Soviet Union's response to Japan's claims to these territories is that it does
not recognize any territorial dispute with Japan. Moscow bases its policy of
nonrecognition on that fact that whatever territorial dispute there might be is a fait
accompli in the context of the terms of:
a) The Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945
b) The Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943
c) The Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945, accepted by Japan on August 14,
1945
d) The San Francisco Peace Treaty of September 8, 1951
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e) The Memorandum of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAPIN
No. 677) of January 29, 1946 [Ref. 81: p. 501]
One reason for this failure in settling the dispute stems from the Soviets'
adamancy on their position that these islands are not subject to negotiation. In
Moscow's view, any territorial concessions to Japan would reinforce other nations'
claims to disputed territories lost to the Soviet Union--"once the principle of frontier
immutability has been compromised, hitherto dormant irredentist forces would be
revived in Europe and China" [Ref. 82: p. 132]. From Japan's point of view, though,
economic cooperation may become an effective card for making the Soviet Union
reconsider its position on the issue. Japanese officials believe that the new emphasis
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has placed on domestic reform and economic
moderation may give Tokyo a potential economic leverage which could be turned
advantage on the territorial issue:
Japan has grown so powerful economically-and to a certain extent politically as
well, that the new pragmatic Soviet leaders evidently have made a serious
reassessment of what their country can get from this nation to reinvigorate their
lagging economy. [Ref. 68: p. 26]
Although some diplomats were skeptical about Shevardnadze's visit and
considered Japan as compromising its position by downgrading the territorial issue so
that the return of the islands was not a precondition for improvement in overall
relations, others viewed it as a slight breakthrough over the previous stone-wall stance
adopted by Gromyko. As one diplomatic source commented:
The Japanese sense ferment in the Gorbachev regime and are confident that once
they get their foot in the door they will be able to slowly nudge the Soviets
towards more concessions. [Ref. 68: p. 26]
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While Japan agreed to resume a technological and scientific cooperation agreement, it
refused to negotiate the long-term economic cooperation agreement urged by Moscow,
and Japanese Foreign Ministry officials hinted that they will link this accord to
progress in negotiating the territorial dispute.
Complicating the issue of the Northern Territories is the fact that in recent years,
the Soviet Union has greatly expanded its Pacific Fleet with both ships and
nuclear-bearing submarines, has expanded and updated their Air Force in the Soviet
Far East. It has fortified its position there by constructing airfields and military
facilities and by deploying ground troops on the disputed islands.
Since the mid 1960s, the Soviets have consistently deployed anywhere from 25 to
35 percent of their nuclear and conventional forces to the Far Eastern regions of the
Soviet Union. However, until the 1970s, the United States enjoyed an unrivalled
superiority over the Soviet Union in its nuclear umbrella. Today the situation has
changed. The downing of the South Korean 747 airliner over the Sea of Japan in
September 1983 was a dramatic manifestation of the extent of the Soviet Union's
power base in Northeast Asia and the rest of the Pacific region.
This episode and its subsequent handling by the Soviet authorities have
underscored the USSR's wanton disregard for innocent lives and Moscow's sensitivity
regarding its military stakes in the region. Those stakes embrace the security of the
Soviet Union's outposts (to include the disputed Kurile Islands), wartime control of the
Seas of Japan and Okhotsk as part of the SSBN strategy of strategic missile-submarine
deployments, and the security of sea lines of communication (SLOC) which links the
ever-expanding Soviet naval presence around the Asian rimlands [Ref. 78: p. 27]. In
light of the Soviet buildups in East Asia, there are now some questions regarding the
nature of the military balance there.
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According to Japan's Defense Agency, the Soviets have deployed 40 divisions
(approximately 370,000 troops) in East Asia. Additionally, as shown in Figure 4.3, the
presence of almost 25 percent of its air force's entire operational aircraft, consisting of
420 bombers, 1500 tactical fighters (to include some of their most advanced fighters,
such as the Su-24 Fencer and the MiG-27 Flogger) and 150 patrol planes (including
between 70 and 90 supersonic Tu-22 Backfire bombers) assigned to this region have
been cause for concern. Moreover, the Soviet Union has deployed about 25 percent of
its entire navy, including carriers, destroyers, and some 140 submarines [Ref. 83: pp.
30-31].
The Soviet Union's Pacific Fleet is said to be the largest of the USSR's four
fleets. According to US sources, the Pacific Fleet now consists of some 837 ships,
compared to the 212 ships of the US Pacific Fleet. Some of the Soviet Union's most
modern naval units have joined the Soviet Fleet in recent years, including 2 Kiev-class
aircraft carriers, 3 Kara-class guided missile anti-submarine warfare carriers, an Ivan
Rogov amphibious ship, and a nuclear-powered Kirov-class battle cruiser, the world's
most powerful and modern warship. [Ref. 84: p. 15, pp. 91-110] The growth of Soviet
naval power in the Asian-Pacific region has accelerated ever since the emergence of
outward signs of strong Sino-Vietnamese disagreement, particularly in the period since
the Vietnam-PRC conflict of 1979. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will be easily
persuaded to withdraw its naval units from the region, while it is highly likely that they
will continue to remain there into, at the very least, the medium-term future.
Another area of deep concern for the Japanese is the issue of the Soviet
deployment of both strategic and non-strategic missiles and in ground forces generally.
The Soviet Union began deploying intermediate range SS20s in 1977 and has some 170
of the weapons targeted on East Asia. [Ref. 85: p. 175] A similar trend is noticed by
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the Japanese in the Soviet deployment of ICBMs and strategic bombers which are
deployed along the Trans-Siberian Railway and in the Sea of Okhotsk. According to
the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the USSR has deployed some
380 ICBMs, including modern high performance missiles like the SS18s and SS-N-18s
[Ref. 86: p. 85].
What are the implications of this buildup in East Asia and in the Pacific for
Japan? Will the increased Soviet strength pose a danger of a direct military attack
against Japan? Some critics of Japan's current increases in defense spending argue that
the Soviet intention is not offensive but defensive. They say that the Soviet Union has
no particular cause to threaten Japan, because unlike in Central Europe or on the
Sino-Soviet border, there is no historical basis for a Soviet-Japanese conflict. They
also charge that the military balance in the Asia-Pacific remains strongly in favor of
the United States, a view shared by many American defense analysts [Ref. 87].
Proponents of increased Japanese defense buildup agree that there is no serious
threat of an isolated Soviet attack on Japan, but they argue that Japan is a target by
virtue of its geographic position relative to the Soviet Far East. Colonel Nishimura
Shigeki of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) Defense Planning Staff,
pointed out that Japan sits astride the three narrow straits (the Tsugaru, Soya, and
Tsushima Straits) that provide an exit for the Vladivostok-based Soviet Pacific Fleet
out of the Sea of Japan, and that under circumstances of global confrontation, Japan
would be a priority target (see Figure 4.3). [Ref. 87] Also, many Japanese defense
planners believe it inconceivable that relations would deteriorate to the stage whereby
the Soviet Union would risk a direct armed attack on Japan, especially with the
Japan-US alliance in force. However, the Soviet military presence in East Asia is
definitely not a benign one. In addition to backing Vietnamese occupation of
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Kampuchea, Soviet military deployments raise widespread concern as well as defense
expenditures and pose a serious threat to Japan's sea lanes, thereby altering the
regional power balance, whether real or perceived. [Ref. 88: p. 34] Yet, according to
Kurihara Osamu, former Secretary-General of the Defense Council (Japan's highest
policy-making organ for military strategy, admitted that Japan's air defenses would be
wiped out in 10 minutes, its naval forces would face the same fate in two or three days,
while the ground forces would be destroyed in four days under an attack by a major
enemy. [Ref. 89: p. 34]
Clearly, then, Japan's most pressing defense issues are improving the deficiencies
in air and sealane defense, and particularly the ability to deny Soviet passage through
the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya Straits. Only by expanding and upgrading its defense
forces.would Tokyo be able to effectively nullify Soviet capability of intimidating Japan
in the Asian-Pacific region. The next few years will show what sort of defense will be
chosen and how far the limits of Japan's territorial boundaries will range. American
interests and Japanese willingness for a larger regional role will be the determinants of
those choices for the near future.
66
V. JAPAN AND NORTHEAST ASIA
Northeast Asia holds a position of unique importance for the world as this is the
region where a series of triangular relationships exist among the major powers--the
United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan-each of
which has extensive interests and commitments. The reemergence of Japan's political
role in this region further complicates the delicate balance which exists among the
these regional powers.
Japan has had a special interest in Northeast Asia since historic times. In an
effort to expand and protect its sphere of influence, Japan fought both China and
Russia, in major wars at the turn of the century. By emerging as the victor of those
wars, Japan had bid for and held diplomatic leadership in Asia, but the intervention of
Russia, Germany, and France demonstrated that the European powers would not allow
Tokyo to gain a strategic foothold on the Asian continent. The Treaty of Portsmouth
at the end of the Russo-Japanese War did not fully satisfy Japan's desires for
concessions, either. In short, Japan was denied its role as the leader of Asia [Ref. 90: p.
252].
In the following decades, Japan struggled to gain world recognition as a major
power. The practical need for securing Asian markets and resources for its burgeoning
capitalist economy was a reinforced Tokyo's psychological impetus to appease Japan's
sense of wounded pride received from the rebuff given by the European powers.
Instead of being averse to the idea of colonialism, Japan accepted Western imperialism
and expanded across Asia. To the Japanese, the War in the Pacific (or,, as it was
officially named, Taiheiyo Senso), was not so much an act of Japanese militarism as it
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was an act of defensive nationalism for the purpose of realizing the Dai Toa Kyoeiken,
or the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere [Ref. 90: p. 252], following the examples
set by the Western powers.
Since entering the post-war period, Japan has faced a number of hurdles in its
foreign relations, some originating internally, others externally. The focus of this
chapter then, will be on the external factors affecting Japan's global and regional
strategies in its foreign relations, particularly in the economic, political-diplomatic, and
military dimensions.
Because Japan has the largest and most advanced economy in the Asian Pacific
region, maintaining good bilateral relations with its neighbors is crucial to Japan's
Asian security policy. With the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States, Japan
has been able to concentrate its energy and resources on developing its economy to
become the second greatest economic power in the world. However, there are very
difficult political decisions facing Japan on the issue of becoming more actively
involved in global and especially regional affairs, of which an enhanced security role for
Japan is a key consideration. In the first place, overcoming the pacifist domestic
feeling which is against an increased military role for Japan is a serious obstacle.
Another more important challenge is persuading China, Taiwan, the two Koreas, the
ASEAN states, Australia, and New Zealand-all of which are apprehensive about an
increased Japanese military presence in the region—that Tokyo's assumption of a larger
defense role will not pose a threat to their own national security.
Although Japan has shied away from playing a greater military role in East Asia,
its enormous economic power, its attempts at pursuing friendly relations with both the
PRC and the USSR, and its attempts at settling the Kampuchean issue, are invariably
placing Japan at the forefront of "omni-directional diplomacy", with Japan finding
itself playing the role of mediator.
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A. RELATIONS WITH CHINA
Ever since diplomatic normalization in September 1972, Japan and the People's
Republic of China (PRC) have achieved a surprising degree of mutual cooperation in
diplomatic as well as economic fields. In addition, the signing of the Sino-Japanese
Peace and Friendship Treaty six years later ushered in a new era in the relations
between the two countries. Since then, Japanese firms have concluded numerous
contracts with China as it began an ambitious modernization program for its
agriculture, industry, defense, science, and technology. Japan is enthusiastically aiding
China in virtually every aspect of its modernization except defense, particularly in the
selling or exporting of military hardware. Japan will refrain from selling weapons to
China under the guidelines set by its self-imposed arms export ban, i.e. Japan will not
sell military hardware to communist countries. Also, military equipment in the hands
of a still unpredictable China would pose security risks, and one which could produce a
potential "boomerang effect" for the weapons suppliers.
The conclusion of two major agreements between Japan and China (the
Sino-Japanese Long-Term Trade Agreement and the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace
and Friendship) and the Chinese decision to implement the "Four Modernizations"
program in 1978 has contributed to the significant improvement in Sino-Japanese
economic relations. In its push for its economic modernization programs, China has
relied heavily on Japan for both capital and technology. Indeed, the most obvious
indication of this success can be seen in the rapid expansion of bilateral trade between
Japan and China, from Sl.l billion in 1972 to more than $13 billion in 1984 (see Table
9), and in Japan's predominant position as China's largest trading partner, capturing
about 26 percent of China's total external trade in 1984 [Ref. 25: pp. 39-40],
Moreover, in 1983, China moved from sixth to fifth place among Japan's leading
trading partners, taking about a 4 percent share of Japan's total trade [Ref. 91: p. 20].
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The expansion of bilateral trade and China's increasing capability to supply
Japan with badly-needed raw materials and energy supplies can best be understood in
the context of countering Soviet proposals for joint economic ventures in Siberia
(considered to be detrimental to the PRC's strategic interests along the Sino-Soviet
border), and for Chinese leaders' desire to gain support in Japan [Ref. 92: p. 98].
TABLE 9
JAPAN'S TRADE WITH CHINA ($ MILLIONS)
YEAR EXPORTS IMPORTS TOTAL
1972 609 491 1100
1978 3049 2130 5079
1982 3510 5352 8862
1983 4914 5087 10001
1984 7217 5958 13175
1985* 6150 3200 5350
Manuary-June, 1985
SOURCES: Japan Institute for Social and Economic Affairs (ed.), Japan 1985,
an International Comparison (Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, 1985), p. 40; Far
Eastern Economic Review, August 1, 1985, p. 47.
Japan was the first non-Communist country to publicly give economic aid to
China. Indeed, Japan's economic assistance continues to play a key role in the future
development of the PRC's modernization program. After the first loan of 300 billion
yen for 1979-1983, Prime Minister Nakasone promised during his China visit in March
1984 another loan of 470 billion yen ($2.08 billion) for 1984-1990 [Ref. 93: pp. 7-1 1J.
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In addition to the S8 billion in credits several of Japan's commercial banks
offered in 1979, the Japanese government made commitments to provide S3. 6 billion in
official development loans and more than S4.4 billion in Ex-Im Bank loans While
Japanese credits have been an important factor in the successful implementation of
China's modernization programs, Japanese technical assistance and sophisticated
hardware and technology have also contributed significantly to the development of
several key industries in China, e.g. steel, fertilizer, synthetic textiles, etc [Ref. 94: p.
44].
Insofar as the prospects for the future of Sino-Japanese economic relations are
concerned, the trends seem to indicate a continuation of close cooperation between the
two countries. With its new emphasis on the "Four Modernizations" program, China
is determined to forge ahead in order to quadruple its GNP by the year 2000. Because
of China's immense needs for foreign capital and technology in its economic
modernization programs, it is likely that China will continue to seek Japan's economic
and technical assistance. The complementary nature of the two economies [Ref. 94: p.
40, 47] almost ensures Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, since China is not only a
potentially huge market for Japan's exports, but also an important source of energy
and resources.
The signing of the peace treaty with China spurred cordial Sino-Japanese
political relations as well. For example, beginning in 1980, Japan and China agreed to
establish regular ministerial meetings between the two countries to discuss problems of
common interests. Moreover, senior Chinese and Japanese officials have met with
some regularity, along with a substantial number of exchange visits between the leaders
of the two countries [Ref. 95: p. 525]
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Japan's friendship with China is very important for two reasons. Economic
merits are obviously one, but less obvious is the political merits gained from such a
friendship. Though Japan has paid its fair share of the political prices, i.e. severance of
political ties with Taiwan and a deterioration in its relations with the Soviet Union, it
has benefitted immensely from the cessation of Chinese propaganda attacks on
Japanese militarism. The discontinuation of these attacks helped to eliminate sources
of trouble, such as the intensification of internal conflicts in Japan on issues ranging
from national security to economic policies, tensions in East Asia, and suspicion
toward Japan's intentions in Southeast Asia [Ref. 96: p. 102].
Another political payoff for Japan could be realized in a possible enhancement of
its diplomatic involvement in Northeast Asia-Japan can play a potentially useful role
in "reunifying" China. When Ji Pengfei (State Councillor and head of the Hong Kong
and Macau Affairs Office) visited Japan, he explained to the Japanese government and
business community the PRC's policy towards Hong Kong, and sought their
cooperation in maintaining the stability and prosperity of the territory through
continued Japanese investment and through their recognition Of the international
status of the new Hong Kong administration after the British withdrawal. Japanese
cooperation and support will certainly be important factors in a settlement capable of
maintaining Hong Kong's existing functions, such as free port and international
financial center. [Ref. 92: pp. 105-106]
From the security standpoint, the Japanese-Chinese relationship has its
advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, the reduction of tension with China is
perhaps the most important for Japan. With the normalization of Sino-American
relations, Japan has pursued its own independent relationship with the PRC,
encompassing the gamut of economic, political, and security concerns. The general
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improvement in Sino-Japanese relations in the post-Mao era has contributed to peace
and stability in Northeast Asia. Two high-level visits cemented Sino-Japanese
relations-China's Party Secretary Hu Yao-bang visited Japan in November 1983 while
Japan's Prime Minister Nakasone reciprocated in March 1984. The exchange of
thoughts between the two leaders did not concentrate exclusively on economic matters,
as might have been expected, but on a wide range of international issues such as the
situation on the Korean Peninsula and trends in Sino-US, Japan-US, Sino-Soviet, and
Japanese-Soviet relations [Ref. 97: pp. 7-11].
In the aftermath of Chinese party leader Hu Yao-bang's visit to Japan, there
were noticeable improvements in Sino-Japanese relations, especially in regard to
Japan's defense policy. Prime Minister Nakasone allayed any fears on China's part of
a revival of Japanese militarism by emphasizing his government's adherence to Japan's
"Peace" Constitution and a defense policy designed strictly for defensive purposes.
Hu's response was that "China's trust in Japan was so deep that it was confident that
Japan would never invade China, even if Japan's defense capability were expanded"
[Ref. 95: p. 536]. There has been a trend towards convergence of thinking on security
issues, as evidenced by Deng's endorsement of not only the continuation of the
US-Japan security treaty, but also of Japan's right to strengthen its self-defense
capability. China does not consider as threatening the buildup of Japan's Ground
Self-Defense Forces; nor is an expansion in its Maritime Self-Defense Forces, as long
as the that expansion in the MSDF is along the lines of improving its surveillance
capability of the sea lanes. [Ref. 98] The two countries share common strategic
interests in containing the Soviet threat, as Tokyo and Beijing both perceive Moscow's
military buildup in Asia to be the most serious threat to their national security
[Ref. 93].
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On the other hand, the reduction of political friction between Japan and China
has also drawn Japan into Sino-Soviet conflicts as the Soviet Union began to accuse
Japan of standing by China, rather than remaining a neutral bystander [Ref. 96: p.
102]. Soviet thinking on this matter regards the growing Sino-Japanese relationship as
an alliance to oppose Soviet influence. Indeed, there are contentions that a
Japanese-Chinese-American alliance is in the making, if it does not already exists
[Ref. 99: p. 12].
Future Sino-Japanese military ties, if and when they are implemented, are likely
to be low-key. This will enable Tokyo to dispel any appearances of open military
cooperation with the Chinese. Anything more could result in increasing the political
and economic strains between Japan and the Soviet Union. As will be discussed in
greater depth later in this chapter, Japanese relations with the ASEAN states would
also be strained. [Ref. 100: p. 63]
In an effort to quell any misgivings about its intentions, the Japanese Foreign
Ministry announced that it recognized the limitations of Sino-Japanese military
cooperation, implying that closer defense ties with China would occur only within the
parameters of the US-Japan Security Treaty [Ref. 101: p. C3J. In any regard, Japan
should remain conscious of the potential dangers of China's long-term ambitions in
Asia-Pacific, and to take into consideration the concerns of its Southeast Asian
neighbors and of the United States.
In the ensuing decades, Japan's key objective will be a balancing of its security
interests with viable diplomatic and economic interaction in its relations with the PRC.
A moderate, prosperous, and stable China is important for the cause of peace and
stability in East Asia; a China that is floundering and chaotic would threaten that
peace and stability. On the other hand, however, Japan will maintain a cautious policy
toward China, in order to prevent Tokyo-Beijing relations from taking on an
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anti-Soviet posture. This somewhat "even-handed" policy toward the PRC and USSR
originated from the anti-hegemonism clause which was included in the Treaty of Peace
and Friendship with China in 1978, with Japan being adamant that this clause be
included so that the treaty would not affect its relations with the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 102: pp. 54-56]
Japan must do what is necessary to ensure that the PRC continues to devote its
energies to growth and modernization in a peaceful, supportive environment in Asia.
It will be much to Japan's advantage to contribute to China's economic health and
development. If China continues to concentrate on its modernization efforts, then it
needs Japan. Therefore it is probable to assume that China will avoid major foreign
policy movements that would antagonize Japan and thereby endanger the realization of
its modernization programs. At the same time, however, China will also be cautious in
its relations with Japan. Given the modest reconciliation made thus far between
Beijing and Moscow, China will not want to jeopardize its position with the USSR by
becoming too close to Japan and will seek, instead, more equidistance in its relations
with Japan, as well as with the US and USSR. [Ref. 103: p. C2] The growing ties
between Japan and China have contributed to peace and stability in Northeast Asia,
especially the Korean peninsula, and will in all probability remain a stabilizing factor
for regional peace and security in the future.
1 . Taiwan
After normalization of Japanese diplomatic with the PRC in 1972, the general
pattern of Sino-Japanese relations continued to run the way it has been since the
1960s. Essentially, Japanese policy toward China has been conducted on a defacto
"two-China" policy. In its efforts to normalize relations with Beijing, and not sacrifice
either its economic or security interests, Tokyo agreed to recognize the PRC as the seat
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of the sole legal government of China, while at the same time not acknowledging the
Beijing's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. On the other hand, Japan continues to
maintain economic relations with Taiwan. Thus, while Taipei and Beijing adamantly
proclaim that there is only one China, and that politics and economics are inseparable,
Japan has managed to preserve as vague a definition of Taiwan's sovereignty as
possible and has steadily expanded economic ties through the genius of seikei bunri to
become the leading trade partner of both Chinas. [Ref. 25: pp. 39-40]
The importance of Taiwan is evident in the eyes of Japanese defense planners,
for it occupies a strategic position on the shipping routes to the south and southwest,
both of which are vital to Japan's security and survival. Moreover, Taiwan occupies
the critical center of the sea and air passages employed by Soviet forces transiting to
and from bases in the Soviet Maritime Province and Vietnam. Most of the supplies for
the Soviet far Eastern military bases traverse the Taiwan Strait or the Bashi Channel,
both of which could be interdicted from Taiwan. [Ref. 104: p. 55] Taiwan has played a
crucial role in both US and Japanese strategy in countering the Soviet Union threat in
the Asia-Pacific, but the military necessity of retaining it has been increasingly
questioned lately, the biggest argument being that the tension which existed between
Taipei and Beijing is no longer salient as it once was earlier [Ref. 89: p. 37].
Furthermore, the military value of Taiwan in protecting the sea lanes along the island's
east coast is minimal—the PRC could easily interdict shipping there even without
establishing bases on Taiwan because of its substantial submarine force [Refs. 66,86: p.
17 & p. 91].
As far as Japan and Taiwan is concerned in the field of diplomacy, Dr. Joseph
Y.S. Cheng (a lecturer in the Department of Government and Public Administration
of the Chinese University of Hong Kong) has raised an interesting proposal regarding
76
Japan's possible role as an intermediary. According to Dr. Cheng, the Japanese
government, through the members of the Taiwan lobby in the Liberal Democratic
Party and leaders of the opposition parties such as the Komeito, may be able to play
the role of mediator between Beijing and Taipei. He noted that in recent years, the
PRC's leaders have been cultivating its ties with Kishi Nobosuke, a former Japanese
premier and a trusted friend of the Chiang regime in Taiwan. Although Kishi himself
has yet to visit the PRC, several of his aides have already done so. In addition, several
Komeito politicians have visited Taiwan, which could lead one to speculate that an
intermediary role may be in the minds of their party leaders. [Ref. 92: p. 106]
B. THE KOREAN PENINSULA
1. South Korea
The year 1985 marked the twentieth anniversary of normalization between
Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) since 1965. From the onset of normalization,
Japan-ROK bilateral relations have warmed and chilled repeatedly. Conflicts over the
history textbook revisions and problems with economic and defense cooperation have
put a damper on improved relations. Nonetheless, the summit meeting in January
1982 between Prime Minister Nakasone and President Chun established a strong basis
for friendly cooperative relations.
As well as normalizing relations, the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty of 1965 also
established a framework of economic and political cooperation for the two countries.
In its post-normalization relations with South Korea, Japan's policy toward Korea
continues to be guided by three essential interests. In the first place, Japanese
•^For an excellent historical treatment of the textbook controversy, see Chong-sik
Lee, "History and Politics in Japanese-Korean Relations: The Textbook Controversy
and Beyond," Journal of Northeast Asian Studies 4 (December 1983): 69-93.
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economic assistance is regarded as crucial for the continued progress of the ROK's
economic development plans. Secondly, Japan's South Korea policy involves the
question of it's role in the security of the ROK, particularly in the context of Northeast
Asian security. Finally, Japan's mediatory role in the North-South dialogue is
considered to be an important factor in its quest for achieving stability on the Korean
peninsula. [Ref. 105: pp. 1088-89]
South Korea, even more so than China, has crucial economic links with
Japan. For instance, trade with Japan accounted for nearly 25 percent of South
Korea's total trade in 1983. Japan supplies advanced industrial plants and equipment
and other high technology products as well. Korea depends heavily on Japan for the
introduction of new machinery technology. According to Korean government
statistics, Japan transferred 58.9 percent of the total machinery technology at the end
of March 1985. Also, Japanese capital makes up more than half of Korea's total
foreign investment. In 1984, Japanese investment totalled SI 14 million, sharply up
from the previous year's total of S3 million. [Ref. 106: p. 7]
Historically speaking, Japanese economic assistance has contributed
significantly to Korea's economic "miracle". In the First Five Year Plan (1962-1966),
the Japanese contributed 29 percent of the total foreign capital requirement (S630.3
million). In the Second Five Year Plan, although Japanese aid dropped to 19.3 percent
of a substantially enlarged total capital requirement of nearly $3 billion. In the Third
Five Year Plan, the amount of the Japanese contribution went up again to 30 percent
(S995 million). [Ref. 105: pp. 1088-1089]
In addition to introducing a large amount of capital into the Korean
economy, Japan is also a major source of technology for Korean industrial
development, the best-known example being the turnkey import for the construction of
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the Pohong Iron and Steel Company Plant (POSCO), which was completed in early
1971. Today, POSCO has become the most efficient steel producer in the world,
beating out Japan's Kobe Steel. [Ref. 107]
Since 1981, one of two major irritants from Seoul's perspective is Japan's
seeming reluctance in redressing the chronic trade imbalance between the two
countries—the trade deficits of more than $30 billion since normalization occurred. In
recent years, the ROK has run an annual deficit of $3 billion in trade with Japan. The
trade deficit problem could be overcome if two prerequisites are met. The first would
be a dramatic increase in South Korean exports to Japan; however, the solution to this
problem may be long in coming. Like its ally, the United States, South Korea faces
tariffs and a closed market in Japan. Import restrictions in Japan abound-Japan
imposes an average of 10-17 percent duties on Korean goods (as opposed to the 5-8
percent duty imposed on American and European goods), and levies more than 23
kinds of indirect and nontariff import barriers. To compound the issue, most of South
Korea's commodities exportable to Japan, i.e. television sets, cars, ships, etc., are also
produced in Japan.
Conversely speaking, the other possible solution would be for South Korea to
reduce imports from Japan through diversification of its import sources. This is one
area in which South Korea has been successful and over the years, South Korea has
been able to diversify economic ties with a large number of countries worldwide. South
Korea's imports from Japan has dwindled from a 41.1 percent share of the world total
(SI 94 million) in 1966 to 22 percent (S5,350) in 1982 [Ref. 108].
The other major obstacle towards smoother economic relations is the
technology transfer issue still pending between the two countries. As previously
mentioned, because of the similarities in their economic structures, fierce competition
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has resulted for securing overseas markets. South Korea is now challenging Japan's
dominance in many industrial fields such as shipbuilding, electronics, and iron and
steel. It will not be too far in the future when South Korea becomes competitive with
Japan in the automobile and semiconductor industries as well.
The ROK's economic development has paralleled that of Japan, thereby giving
Japanese businessmen a well-grounded basis for their fears of the "boomerang effect"
taking place. Japan is worried that the transfer of high technology now would later
enable Korean industries to compete directly with Japanese firms on the world market.
In a speech delivered in Seoul shortly after President's Chun's visit to Japan, the
president of Japan's business organization, Keidanren, made the following statement
concerning its "anti-boomerang" trade policy:
The United States is suffering from a 'boomerang effect' of having provided
technology to Japan following World War II. In view of this experience, it
would not seem unreasonable for Japan to guard against a boomerang effect
from South Korea in dealing with the request for high technology. [Ref. 109: p.
23]
However, unlike its relationship with the ASEAN states, the nature of Japan's
relationship with Korea is fundamentally different. The economies of Korea and Japan
are not complementary; in fact, they share more similarities than not, as they both lack
adequate natural and energy resources. Consequently, the two are very much
dependent on international trade for securing raw materials and energy resources as
well as for marketing their manufactured products [Ref. 1 10: p. 37]. When two similar
economies promote similar products, competition in overseas markets will be the
inevitable result.
What is most interesting about South Korea's economic development is that
not only does it bear an uncanny resemblance to Japan's, but it has also prompted
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Korea to adopt an increasingly Japan-like security outlook. Although South Koreans
are more dependent on armed security than the Japanese, the rapid expansion of their
economy has made Korea more vulnerable to the same sorts of economic threats that
Japan faces [Ref. Ill: p. 26].
Because of these trends toward convergence, Koreans are in no position to
criticize the Japanese, for they would, in effect, be seen as criticizing themselves in the
eyes of those who perceive South Korea as another Japan. Here in the United States,
members of Congress have "repeatedly expressed concern that, in following Japan's
example, Korea would be contributing to the pressure for protectionist solutions to
unfair targeting practices. . ." [Ref. 112: p. VI]. The implication of a convergence of
South Korean thinking about non-military factors in national security toward an
economics-oriented approach like Japan is that the Japanese may become more
empathetic towards the ROK, which in turn, could lead to a Japan becoming more
concerned about South Korean security [Ref. Ill: p. 26]. But several questions remain
to be answered: what is Japan going to do about these concerns? Will Japan persist
in a laissez-faire attitude to the security issue, or will it begin to assume a greater
regional defense role? The following section on Japan's security role vis-a-vis South
Korea, will attempt to find some answers, if any, to these questions.
Maintaining good economic relations is just one side of the coin; equally
important are the military relations between Japan and South Korea. Both countries
regard political stability and military balance on the Korean peninsula as vital to their
security. In his paper, "Japan's Security Policy Toward Korea," Dr. Edward A. Olsen
writes that Japan's tatamae position—what the Japanese say for public consumption—is
that it recognizes Korean security as being important to Japan (as demonstrated in the
Nixon-Sato talks of 1969). However, its honne position-what the Japanese really
believe in their "heart of hearts"-is one of disinterest, "relief that external
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responsibility for Korean security was no longer in Japan's hands, joy that Americans
were content to bear the burdens of defending Korea", and one in which "Japan would
stand by the US if Americans ever had to rescue South Korea again." [Ref. Ill: pp.
17-18]
Although there is no military treaty between Japan and the ROK, there are
certain values which they share in common. As members of the Western alliance and
treaty partners with the United States, they have the similar objective of defending
freedom and democracy. Consequently, Japan and South Korea have a. basis for
cooperation without an official military alliance not one of the ASEAN leaders
criticized Nakasone's defense buildup program [Ref. 113: p. 32]. Japan is placing more
emphasis on the connection between its own security and South Korea's, but the
question of an explicit security relationship between the two countries remains a highly
sensitive issue to both parties. At one end, a majority of the Japanese desire to
preserve the spirit of their "Peace" Constitution and to avoid involvement which might
provoke North Korea into demanding increased military assistance from its allies. At
the other end, the idea of any direct participation of Japanese military forces in South
Korea's defense is unacceptable, fearing that any major increase in Japanese military
strength could lead to a resurgence of Japanese military ambitions, or worse, that the
United States would assign to Japan the responsibilities of defending South Korea.
[Ref. 114: p. 282]
The ROK, with its substantial military capability, well-trained and -disciplined
armed forces, and staunch anti-Communist regime, is regarded by conservatives in
Japan as the bulwark of first-line defense against military threats from the Communist
bloc countries. A militarily strong South Korea would further ease Japan's already
light defense burden. There are, however, ambivalent feelings regarding this issue. On
the one hand, some Japanese have privately admitted that a militarily strong and
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politically reunified Korea could seriously challenge Japan's leadership role in East and
Southeast Asia. On the other hand, Japan is reluctant to share Korea's defense
burden. When the Seoul government proposed in 1981 a plan to meet part of the cost
of the 1982-1986 Economic Development Plan, it made a request for S6 billion in
Japanese economic aid. Seoul's linkage of aid to security needs, claiming that the
Japanese government needed to start shouldering the defense burden, was deemed
unacceptable by Tokyo. The Japanese government agreed to discuss the loan only in
terms of economic cooperation with South Korea. [Ref 110: p. 38]
Likewise, the ROK's position toward Japan's defense buildup is equally
ambivalent. While a militarily strengthened Japan capable of defending itself against
the Soviet threat would be welcomed by Seoul, South Korea has expressed concern
over Japan undertaking an expansive military buildup, either because of US pressure
or its own nationalistic mood, for three possible reasons. The first is that an increase
in Japan's military capability could very well cause commensurate reduction in the
American military presence in South Korea and other East Asian areas [Ref. 115: p.
170], best evidenced by the vacillating policies of the Carter administration's attempts
at sharply reducing US troops stationed in Korea. Secondly, from a historical
perspective, many South Koreans still have vivid memories of their 36 years of
Japanese colonial rule and are apprehensive about a remilitarized Japan that could
again pose military threats to them. [Ref. 116: pp. 42-43] Finally, there is a belief that
a stepped-up Japanese military buildup would trigger a Soviet reaction that would
certainly accelerate the already unmanageable arms race and increase tension in
Northeast Asia [Ref. 115: p. 170].
Korea's hesitancy over Japanese rearmament is best expressed in an interview
with South Korea's Foreign Minister Lee Won-Kyung, who regards Japan's efforts at
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strengthening its defense capabilities as an understandable reaction to the Soviet
military buildup in East Asia and as "a factor contributing to peace and stability in this
region." However, he supports those efforts only if they are "within Japanese
constitutional limits and for the purpose of self-defense." [Ref. 117: p. 59] Nevertheless,
South Koreans are beginning to weary of shouldering the burden of maintaining
stability and security on the Korean peninsula. They point to the nearly 7 percent of
GNP that South Korea spends on its national defense as opposed to the less than 1
percent that Japan spends on its security. Though the South Korean government has
pushed for Japan to assume a much larger share of regional defense costs, its efforts at
doing so go unheeded by Tokyo as Seoul does not have the same bargaining power
that Washington does [Ref. 110: p. 38].
- Based on the facts from the foregoing discussion, it is possible to predict that
South Korea is likely to take a more flexible attitude toward Japan assuming an
increased regional security role. Korea's fears of a threat from a remilitarized Japan
will be outweighed by its concerns over the chronic trade imbalance with Japan and
competition for markets abroad. The ROK, like the United States, will no longer stand
for subsidizing Japan's defense. Indeed, as been demonstrated in the past by President
Chun, the odds are that South Korea will continue to increase its demands for Japan
to take a more equitable share of the defense burden. A greater Japanese defense role
would thereby lessen the heavy strain on the South Korean defense budget, and make
more money available on plans for its own national development.
The role neighboring countries play in the maintenance of stability on the
Korean peninsula is very important, this being especially true of Japan. Beginning with
Prime Minister Sato's visit to the United States in 1969, stability on the peninsula
began to be recognized as essential to the security of Japan. The Japanese position
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toward the ROK was manifested in the Nixon-Sato communique of that year, was
proclaimed important in the Carter-Miki talks of 1978, and was again, reconfirmed
during Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to Seoul in 1983 [Ref. 118: p. E2]. It was more
recently reaffirmed at the 23rd joint meeting of the Korea-Japan Cooperation Council
held in May 1985 [Ref. 119: p. 3].
Both South Korea and Japan have acknowledged that peace and security on
the Korean peninsula are not only vitally important for the two countries themselves,
but for all of East Asia as well. The South Korean and Japanese governments have
agreed to make a concerted effort to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula. Through
a joint communique issued during President Chun Doo Hwan's historic visit to Japan
in September 1984, President Chun and Prime Minister Nakasone announced that they
"share the view that the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is
essential to those in East Asia. . ." [Ref. 120]. Nonetheless, the two countries seem to
diverge on their perceptions of the security situation of divided Korea, and on their
approaches to achieving the reduction of tension [Ref. 121: p. 13].
2. North Korea
Japan has had a rather frigid relationship with the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK) ever since North Korean leadership followed the Soviet
example of "bashing" Nakasone for his hawkish stance on defense matters. Relations
worsened further in the fall of 1983 when Japan imposed a ban on most types of
unofficial contacts with the DPRK after the Rangoon bomb incident. However, there
were some visible signs of a thaw in Japan-DPRK relations as seen in the lifting of the
embargo on North Korea in January 1984 by the Japanese government; the opening
up of regular air routes between the two countries; and the meetings of Kim U Jong
(Chairman of the North Korea-Japan Friendship Association) with Ishibashi Masashi
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(Chairman of the Japan Socialist Party), former Prime Minister Miki Takeo, and LDP
Secretary General Kanemaru Shin to discuss plans to set up trade representative offices
in Tokyo and Pyongyang [Refs. 122,123,124].
There are no diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, but there
are relations between the private sectors of the two countries. In an interview with a
leading Japanese newspaper, Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro remarked that North
Korea has begun to show "an extremely flexible posture of holding talks with the
South, approaching Japan in a positive way. . ." [Ref. 125]. Japan regards the
normalization of its relations with North Korea as part of an overall effort in
promoting stability on the peninsula, and subsequently, in Northeast Asia. Tokyo has
thus maintained economic relations with North Korea but on a limited but private
level.
..
Although Tokyo-Pyongyang relations are minimal compared to Tokyo's
relations with Seoul, they are quite significant when seen in the context of Japan-South
Korea relations. In a strategic sense, South Korea believes that Japan's relations with
the DPRK may have an adverse impact on the uneasy equilibrium of power across the
38th parallel, which could then lead to certain military advantages over the ROK. The
ROK holds the North responsible for the tensions on the Korean peninsula, pointing
to the heavy military buildup by North Korea, with significant amounts of
river-crossing equipment deployed along the DMZ and a 104,000 man commando force
as prime examples. [Ref. 126: p. 7]
There are several ways in which Japan could take an active part in reducing
tensions on the Korean peninsula. One would be for Japan to serve as a
behind-the-scenes mediator to ameliorate North-South Korean differences through
bilateral and multilateral efforts. However, because Japan is not in a position to
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openly and actively promote North-South negotiations, it will have to proceed
cautiously and in a low-key manner. As there are no diplomatic relations between
Japan and North Korea, and Tokyo therefore has no means of directly meeting with
North Korea, there are good possibilities that Japan would make various judgements
and moves through China. Because of its precarious "understanding" with Seoul,
Japan finds itself in the horns of a dilemma. Though a reduction of tensions on the
Korean peninsula would more than likely be of significant benefit to Japan, it is
restrained from pursuing an active intermediary role out of fears that such a role might
be perceived as putting over pressure on the South Korean government. [Ref. 127: p.
7]
All the four powers—the United States, Soviet Union, China, and Japan-are
interested in easing tension on the Korean peninsula, since a reunification would
probably be perceived as upsetting the local balance of power. However they are also
quite content with the status quo as well. Since it is doubtful that Japan would find
itself involved in a military cooperation in the near or medium-term future, a more
realistic approach to promoting detente would be by continuing to improve its
economic and cultural relations with North Korea and its close economic and political
ties with South Korea. Some Japanese perceive that the special relationship between
Japan and North Korea may influence Pyongyang to soften its hardline external
position, which may ultimately contribute to the reduction of tension on the Korean
Peninsula [Ref. 128].
Another way would be for Japan to encourage the Seoul government to
liberalize its autocratic political system, thereby reducing some of the domestic tension
that would instigate North Korea into taking advantage of political disturbances.
Finally, Japan could try to stimulate regional economic interdependence, as it is doing
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with the ASEAN states, which would meet both Japanese and South Korean needs to
safeguard against economic vulnerabilities, while providing North Korea a possible
venue that would encourage it to seek, alternative means toward peace. [Ref. Ill: p.
27]
Concerning the North-South talks, Japan could work with the PRC in
performing an intermediatory function as they are both perhaps in the best position to
correct the distorted threat perception of the two Koreas have of each other. While
North Korea has vacillated between its two "mentors", it appears that China may
possess greater persuasive influence on North Korea than the Soviet Union in ending
the DPRK's risk-taking actions against the ROK, and in dispersing its economic and
technological dependence as widely as possible.
The exchange of visits by the two nations' heads of states in 1983 and 1984
ushered in a new era for Japan-Korea relations. The importance of a close relationship
between the two countries has often been emphasized by leaders of both societies, and
it appears that efforts to consolidate their mutual cooperation are underway. The
ROK-Japan Cooperation Council meeting held in Seoul in May 1985 ended on an
optimistic note when President Chun remarked that he was "confident that past
undesirable relations between the two countries (will) be forgotten as ties of genuine
neighborliness and friendship improve" [Ref. 129: p. 3]. Thus, Japan could find itself
playing an enhanced role in shaping the future of the two Koreas based on its
underlying concept in its comprehensive security policy—Pyongyang's need for Japan's
technological know-how and Seoul's dependence on Japanese investments might just
be the factors binding the three governments together. [Ref. 130: pp. 79-80]
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VI. JAPAN AND ITS ASIAN-PACIFIC NEIGHBORS
A. RELATIONS WITH ASEAN
Historically, Japan has been concerned with developments in Southeast Asia out
of the belief that developments in one Asian country would affect all other Asian
countries. The Japanese share the apprehension of its Southeast Asian neighbors that
instability and conflict within the region may invite great power intervention and
competition to the extent that it would raise security risks for all concerned. Also,
Japan is uncomfortable with the North-South problem-the disparity between their
own economic position and that of its neighbors to the south, and views Southeast
Asia as an area in which it may be able to try to find a solution.
The Japanese seem to accept an obligation born of their own political stability
and economic strength to contribute to the region's economic development, which they
regard as the key to promoting its political stabilization. It is against this template
that Japan began to take a more active, though somewhat modest, part in the affairs of
the region, symbolized by its admission to the Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East (ECAFE) in 1953, the Colombo Plan in 1954, and by its presence at the
Bandung Conference in 1955. [Ref. 131: pp. 209-210]
By the 1960s, Japan's burgeoning economy fostered the growth of its aid
program; it began to take initiatives in regional economic affairs by establishing the
Asian Productivity Organization in 1961. Five years later, in 1966, the world witnessed
Japan taking tentative steps towards a more active involvement in Asian regional
politics since World War II by convening the Ministerial Conference for Economic
Development of Southeast Asia and by playing a major role in the organization of the
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Asian Development Bank. The increasing attention paid toward multilateral economic
diplomacy and the quest to gain a seat in a variety of regional clubs indicates Japan's
desire to strengthen its international status. [Ref. 132: p. 154]
Japan's current relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) can at worst be characterized as a "love-hate" relationship, and at best, an
ambivalent one. On the one hand, there still exists strong anti-Japanese sentiments
among various circles, mainly caused by the overwhelming Japanese economic
dominance in the region. On the other hand, this same economic preponderance of
Japan is also a source of criticism, with charges that Japan has not been positive
enough in accepting its economic responsibilities in Southeast Asia. This ambivalency
of sentiments, in effect, poses an awkward dilemma for Japan—if it attempts to be more
outward-looking, it would be accused of bolstering their own influence at the expense
of the countries involved. At the same time, however, if Japanese policy planners
attempted to reduce this level of influence by limiting, for example, the levels of
economic aid, there would be accusations of selfishness. [Ref. 132: p. 163]
Despite this abundance of seemingly contradictory rhetoric, one fact which
cannot be overlooked is that Japan has a wide range of interests in the member
countries of ASEAN. In the first place, the ASEAN region has become increasingly
important as a major source of raw materials, energy supplies, and other natural
resources to Japan, while its vast population provides an important market for
Japanese manufactured products. As a result, it has become deeply involved in both
trade and investment terms. Since the late 1960s, Japan has become the leading
investor, trading partner, and supplier of economic aid to the various ASEAN states.
Its cumulative investments in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have surpassed that
of the United States, while it ranks second in Singapore and the Philippines. In trade,
90
Japan is the number one trading partner for all the ASEAN states except Singapore.
For example, Japan's share in the ASEAN countries' foreign trade in 1983 is shown in
Table 10.
TABLE 10
JAPAN'S TRADE PARTNERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (1981-1983)
Exports to: Imports from:
(%) 1981 1982 1983 1981 1982 1983
Indonesia 30.7 25.9 23.1 47. 4 50.2 45. 7
Malaysia 24.6 21. 1
Philippines 18.9 20.1 17.1 21.9 22. 9 19. 9
Singapore 18.8 17.9 18.0 10. 1 10. 9 9.2
Thailand 24.0 23.5 27.3 14.2 13. 7 15. 5
Brunei* 22.5 23.9 19.1 69. 7 68.2 67. 7
*Brunei did not join
here for the purpose
ASEAN until January 1984, but trade fig
of comparison.
ures are included
SOURCES: Calculated from Direction of Trade Statistics, Yearbook
International Monetary Fund, and 1982 Yearbook of International




Secondly, ASEAN's increasing importance is further underscored by its
geographical location—with the lone exception of Thailand, these countries occupy a
strategic position on the sea routes over which oil from the Persian Gulf flows to
Japan. These sea lanes through the ASEAN region have a vital significance for the
Japanese economy, for more than 71 percent of Japan's oil supplies and 40 percent of
its commodity trade (including that with Australia and Europe) pass through the
Malacca Straits [Ref. 25]. Indeed, maintaining access to these sources of energy and
raw materials and expanding exports by fostering economic growth in the ASEAN
countries are the two pillars of Japan's economic policies toward the region.
Thirdly, a related interest which is vitally important for Japan's comprehensive
security is the maintenance of the political, economic, and social peace and stability in
this region. It was Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko who introduced the concept of
comprehensive security after he assumed the office in July 1980. According to this
concept, Japan's security was not to be measured only by its military power but also
by its economic, technological, food, resource and social stability indices, and also by
the level of mutual trust and friendship between the countries involved. Thus, Japanese
policy makers decided to use economic assistance as a major foreign policy tool,
reasoning that by "shrewd application of sufficient economic aid to crucial countries or
regions, enough political, social, and economic resiliency could be promoted so that
conditions leading to internal disorder, disputes, or external intervention might never
develop" [Ref. 15: p. 326]. In short, economic aid is just one means to increase Japan's
security, and no other region in Asia is perceived by Japan as more vital to its political
and economic security than that of Southeast Asia.
A stable political order in this region is viewed as essential to Japan's policy
interests. The importance of ASEAN is reflected in the amount of economic aid it
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receives from Japan. Japan assigns from 30 percent to 35 percent of its bilateral
Overseas Development Aid (ODA) to ASEAN' states-roughly a billion dollars
annually. In turn, ASEAN receives more than half of its bilateral aid from Japan
[Ref. 133: p. 47].
Thailand has long been a major recipient of Japan's ODA, receiving more than
two-thirds of its bilateral aid from Japan. Tokyo has been channeling increasing ODA
resources to Thailand because of its strategic geopolitical location. It regards Thailand
as a front-line state, reasoning that if communism should spread form neighboring
Indochina, it would threaten the stability of ASEAN, which would in turn threaten
Japan's extensive economic and trade interests in that region [Ref. 133: p. 46]. Japan
also allocates aid based on humanitarian concerns, to bolster Thailand's economy in
the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, and the inevitable influx of
Indochinese refugees. Hence Tokyo's design is to provide more aid so that Thailand
will remain economically strong and socially stable, and at the same time, ensure the
sanctity of Japan's own economic security. [Ref. 15: p. 331]
The Philippines has taken on increasing importance as an aid recipient because of
Japan's desire to help it survive the economic crisis fostered largely by the abuse and
mismanagement of the now-defunct Marcos government. The total amount of loans
pledged in 1983 was S271 million, and in 1984 Tokyo promised Manila $150 million in
quick-disbursing commodity loans linked to an International Monetary Fund (IMF)
stabilization program [Ref. 15: p. 331].
Finally, Japan has assumed a sort of moral obligation to respond positively to
the growing expectations of such ASEAN countries as Singapore and Malaysia which
are looking to Japan for guidance in the further development of their economies.
Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore has been carrying on the "learn from
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Japan movement". Under his leadership, the Singaporean government embarked upon
an ambitious all-island beautification campaign, massive industrialization, and housing
renewal projects in 1964, justifying them with the rationale that it "was necessity to
learn from and catch up with Japan" [Ref. 134: pp. 75-76].
As a result of the "learn from Japan movement", a large number of Japanese
enterprises have rushed into Singapore. Besides increasing the number of Japanese
residents to 20,000 as compared with only several thousand in the early 1980s, Japan
has influenced Singapore to adopt its system of business and management techniques.
Furthermore, the Singaporean government, impressed with Tokyo's low crime rate,
adopted the Japanese-style police box system for its own crime prevention program.
[Ref. 134: pp. 77-78]
Malaysia, too, has adopted a similar strategy in its aims at enhancing and
promoting security and development of the country. Its "Look East" policy resulted in
an extensive exchange program whereby a number of its high school graduates were
sent to Japan to receive on-the-spot technical for six months in various fields
,
such as
engineering, personnel management, employee relations, and quality control. Since the
government adopted the "Look East" policy in 1981, more than 430 trainees have been
sent to Japan for technical training [Ref. 134: p. 78].
Malaysia also receives a considerable amount of aid from Japan, because of its
importance to Tokyo's security interests. Besides being a source of essential natural
resources, Malaysia is strategically located on the Straits of Malacca--a vital sea lane
for oil from the Persian Gulf—and along with Thailand, plays a key role in the
stabilization of the political situation in Indochina [Ref. 15: p. 331].
Although Japan would like to play a larger diplomatic role in Southeast Asia, its
chief contribution and focus remain in the economic sphere. Nevertheless, there has
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been some slight but notable shifts in Japan's economic policy toward ASEAN, which
involve Japanese aspirations to play a more important political role commensurate
with its economic influence in the region. Japan's visibly active diplomacy in
Southeast Asia was initiated in December 1976 when Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo set
forth the three-point "Fukuda Doctrine":
(a) Japan wishes to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability in
Southeast Asia but will refrain from developing any military role
(b) Japan seeks to intensify its economic cooperation with the ASEAN states
(c) Japan will work towards a "heart-to-heart understanding" with the peoples of
Southeast Asia [Ref. 135: p. 185]
In the political realm, Japan's objective is to create a sphere of prosperity and
stability in this area with non-Communist governments. Its long-term goal is the
achievement of major power status and influence in Southeast Asia. That is not to say
that Japan wishes to become the predominant power with a controlling influence,
rather, its policy is to prevent a single hostile power from dominating this region
[Ref. 132: pp. 153-154].
Aside from seeking memberships in the various organizations outlined earlier,
another way Japan has safeguarded its economic interests and promoted its political
influence was by playing the role of diplomatic mediator. Between 1963 and 1965
Japan made two attempts to mediate between Malaysia and Indonesia over the latter's
confrontation policy toward the former. Although the outcome in either case did not
quite meet the expectations of Tokyo, Japan did succeed in maintaining an open
dialogue between the two countries, particularly after Britain had broken ofT diplomatic
relations and the US had suspended economic and political ties with Jakarta. Japan
took on the mediatory role in regional conflicts again in 1970 when it participated with
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Indonesia and Thailand in convening the May conference on the Cambodia crisis
[Ref. 132: pp. 154-155].
Yet another step towards increasing Japan's political influence was taken in
January 1981, when Prime Minister Suzuki visited Southeast Asia and sought to
establish "conceptual priorities" for future Japanese-ASEAN relations: rural and
agricultural development; energy development; human resources development through
programs for education, management, and technical training; and the promotion of
labor-intensive small and medium enterprises [Ref. 110: p. 34]. In addition, the terms
of Japanese aid had become exceedingly attractive by this time—loans to Indonesia
announced in late 1980 included a ten-year credit of 14.5 billion yen through Japan's
Export-Import Bank at an annual interest rate of 7.5 percent and a 33 billion yen
credit through the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, with an eighteen-year term,
a 2.5 percent interest rate, and a seven-year grace period [Ref. 136].
It is clear from the foregoing discussion the importance of Japan as a major
trading partner to ASEAN. The ASEAN states especially need Japanese economic
cooperation and technological assistance. Also, Japan is the most important market
for the region's raw materials, metals and ores, and crude oil. Paradoxically, though,
the very roots of Japan's economic success have created a barrier between Japan and
its Southeast Asian neighbors. Japanese businessmen and officials have often been
criticized for being arrogant and condescending toward other Asians [Ref. 110: p. 35].
Despite these difficulties, though, Japan is making efforts at developing a more
visible political role. This was evidenced by various Japanese government proposals to
act as ASEAN's unofficial spokesman in Washington and in Hanoi. Since the end of
the Vietnam War and with the growing presence of the Soviet Union in Vietnam,
Japan's role as a mediator between ASEAN and Vietnam has become increasingly
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accepted. For example, Tokyo lobbied successfully, at ASEAN's request, for
resolutions which called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Kampuchea, the
self-determination of its people without foreign interference, and the continued seating
of Democratic Kampuchea in the United Nations. [Refs. 135,137,138: p. 185, p. 55, p.
10] Indonesia, for example, is supportive of a larger political role for Japan. In an
interview with a leading Japanese newspaper on his visit to Japan last May, Indonesian
Foreign Minister Mochtar said that "I want Japan to rise above its being an economic
big power and contribute to peace in Cambodia in the political field" [Ref. 139: p. 2].
Another area in which Japanese diplomacy made significant progress was
Indochina. In April 1984, Japanese Foreign Minister Abe took, the initiative and
arranged for a meeting between himself and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co
Thach, the first such ministerial meeting in five years. At the meeting, Abe tried to
impress on Vietnam Japan's willingness to help Indochina economically in the event of
a solution to the Kampuchean issue. Furthermore, Abe stressed Japan's willingness to
help finance an international peacekeeping force if one was established in the event of
a Vietnamese military withdrawal. [Ref. 140: p. C5]
To avoid any misunderstanding of its political role, Japan has gone to great
lengths to assure ASEAN leaders that it has no desire of assuming a military role in
the region. At a Japan-ASEAN conference in September 1981, former Prime Minister
Fukuda admitted that Japan possessed the capability to become a military power
commensurate with its economic power, but insisted that Japan intended only to
"become a porcupine or a hedgehog with just enough power to repel enemies when
attacked" [Ref. 135: p. 185].
An area of concern is the development of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation.
Japan's growing relations with the People's Republic of China are often eyed with
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suspicion by the ASEAN states, particularly Indonesia and Malaysia, the two countries
most wary of Communist insurgents allegedly supported by Beijing. The image of an
aggressive, expansionist China remains strong among many of the Southeast Asian
leaders who perceive that China, and not the Soviet Union, poses the greater military
threat to the region, based on geographic proximity and past history of Chinese
expansionism [Ref. 141]. The immediate concern of the ASEAN states over close
Sino-Japanese ties is whether Japan's large-scale assistance to China's economy might
not be disadvantageous to them. Moreover, this concern is underscored by the fact
that two member nations of ASEAN, Singapore and Indonesia, have not yet
established diplomatic ties with the PRC [Ref. 138: p. 10].
Another cause of anxiety for Southeast Asians is the potential for the
development of Japan's role as a military power. Although the Japanese have been
emphatic in allaying fears of a remilitarized Japan, the issue has grown more salient in
view of the increased willingness of Japan in building up its defense capabilities partly
in response to the changed strategic environment and partly in bowing to US pressure
for greater burden sharing. The "history textbook" episode, whereby Japan's
Education of Ministry had rewritten history books to downplay Japanese militarism
during World War II, resuscitated old memories and fears [Ref. 8: p. 12].
Japan's planned expansion of its sea-lanes defense to 1,000 miles is a cause of
concern for its neighbors in the Pacific Basin. The ASEAN states, however, are
divided over Japan playing a larger military role in Southeast Asia. Though Singapore,
Indonesia, and Thailand appear receptive to a limited Japanese military presence in the
Western Pacific, the remainder of the ASEAN countries have misgivings about the
possibility of a Japan which could embark on a course that would once more bring its
armed forces into the region. Memories of Japan's World War II "Great East Asia
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Co-Prosperity Sphere" still haunt many of its neighboring countries, putting a damper
on an increased role for the Japanese military. Some fear that the 1,000 mile plan is
only a first step—once Japan has the capacity to patrol that distance, why stop there?
What's to prevent Japan from patrolling 1,500 or even 7,000 miles?
Indeed, many Asians find it hard to see how the patrolling of only 1,000 miles
would contribute significantly to the security of Japan's vital sea lanes since it is an
additional 6,000 miles to the Persian Gulf oil fields. Moreover, Western and Japanese
security officials have yet to forward a convincing scenario to their Southeast Asian
counterparts as to how sealane protection could be initiated, without a massive
increase in the present rate of Japanese defense spending, before the Soviet Union
would neutralize Japan with nuclear and conventional forces [Ref. 8: p. 13].
On the other hand, however, there are indications which reflect a gradual
acceptance of an enhanced security role for Japan. An interesting development
occurred when Prime Minister Nakasone made a tour of the ASEAN states prior to
the Williamsburg summit in 1983—Japanese correspondents accompanying him were
surprised that not one of the ASEAN leaders criticized Nakasone's defense buildup
program [Ref. 113: p. 36]. Even Philippines' Marcos, who once stated in a press
conference during his visit to the United States in September 1982 that Japan still had
ambitions to control Asia [Ref. 142], remarked that Prime Minister Nakasone had
convinced him that Japan had no intention of reviving militarism or becoming a
menance to its neighbors. The only other government which had expressed earlier
misgivings about Japan's military intentions also endorsed an expansion of Japan's
defense forces. President Suharto of Indonesia told Nakasone that as long as Tokyo's
policy aimed only at protecting Japan, there would be no problems. [Ref. 143: pp.
15-16]
99
These facts seem to suggest a growing, albeit a reluctant, acceptance of Japan
playing a larger security role in the near future. The reasons are partly due to Japan's
perceived need to protect its sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), and partly due to
the belief of many ASEAN leaders that the US will increasingly shift its responsibilities
toward the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf regions.
Though doubts still linger about the desirability of a Japanese defense buildup,
most Southeast Asian defense planners and officials identify Japan's rationales for an
expansion in its defense forces as being the same as their own. The growing support
for greater Japanese defenses is closely interrelated to those of public support for
defense increases and allied reliability. Southeast Asians fear the aggressiveness of
Soviet diplomacy may threaten to destabilize non-Communist countries in Southeast
Asia if they do not cease their support for anti-Vietnamese forces there through
insurgency support or physical military presence. [Ref. 8: p. 21] Moreover, ASEAN
analysts reason that if a buildup is inevitable, it would be to ASEAN's advantage to
work with the Japanese in defining a common defense policy against a mutually
identified threat and to institutionalize future Japanese-ASEAN defense cooperation
preferably with an American linkage or on an intra-regional basis It has also been
reported that Thailand, Singapore, and even Indonesia have been involved in security
consultations with Japan [Ref. 144: p. 283].
The ASEAN states, like Japan, value highly a stable and peaceful region, for it is
the maintenance of stability and peace which is a prerequisite for future economic and
political development. Japan has been, and probably will continue to be, ASEAN's
major economic partner. One important way in which Japan can contribute indirectly
to Asian-Pacific security is by enhancing its own capacity to defend its homeland and
surrounding seas. However, this improvement in its defense must be undertaken
gradually and within the context of the US-Japan security agreement.
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Because of Japan's growing economic influence and power, an expanding Soviet
military presence, and continuing pressures from the United States for burden-sharing,
it is likely that Japan will begin to take on a larger, more conspicuous role in both
political and military affairs in Southeast Asia. It will be by assuming greater
diplomatic and military responsibilities that Japan will be better able to preserve its
own security as outlined in its comprehensive security concept. The threatening Soviet
posturing can most likely lead to the ASEAN states seeking politico-military
counterweights in the form of a continued US military presence in Southeast Asia, and
also in promoting a greater tolerance for a strengthened Japanese military presence as
well. [Ref. 8: pp. 21-22] The maintenance of close and friendly relations between Japan
and the ASEAN countries, fortified by Japanese contributions to the economic
development, political stability, and military security of these nations is essential for the
security of Japan itself.
B. RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
Nearly a decade has passed since the signing of the Basic Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation on June 16, 1976. As with the Koreans, bitter memories of Japan's
involvement in World War II still remain strong among many Australians. However,
the 1976 treaty, taken in the face of much prejudice and apprehension, was a giant step
forward towards smoother relations between the two countries. The growth of the
relationship between Japan and Australia, little appreciated outside the two countries
and even at times by some within them, has begun to flower. Though the relationship
has never been a smooth one, it is one which both countries believe they have little
choice but to nurture. Nevertheless, the prospects look promising that it will deepen in
the coming years.
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What has brought the two countries together is a booming trade that has made
each increasingly dependent for its economic growth on the economic growth of the
other. Japan would not have been able to build up its manufacturing industries as
rapidly as it did without Australia's resources. At the same time, Australia could not
have gotten its 'resources boom' off the ground without Japan, whose appetite for
massive quantities of resources over a long period of time enabled Australia to obtain
the financing to build up its mines, mining towns, ports and railways [Ref. 145].
Although Japan has not lessened its contacts with Europe, it has increasingly
promulgated trade with Australia and New Zealand. Australia's and New Zealand's
biggest trading partner is, in fact, Japan. Trade between Japan and Australia reached
$9.7 billion from July 1983 to June 1984, more than that between the United States
and Australia. Japan accounts for nearly 35 percent of Australian exports and supplies
21 percent of its imports. Japan's trade with New Zealand totalled SI.4 billion.
[Ref. 146: p. 11]
Australia's trade patterns have gradually shifted away from its traditional
European markets to the Japanese market. A number of factors have contributed to a
reorientation of Australian trade—when Australia's agricultural exports faced increased
barriers in British markets, the products of its mining sector found a ready market in
Asia, Japan in particular. Conversely, Japanese producers have made major inroads
into Australia's market with its familiar export products, at the expense of the British
suppliers [Ref. 147: p. 241]. One of Australia's principal concerns in trade with Japan
is the disproportionate results of trade fluctuations. In an effort to ameliorate these
effects, Australia is pressing Japan for more long-term contracts for raw materials,
energy resources, wool and beef. The Australian beef issue has continually plagued
Japan-Australia relations, but on June 26, 1984, the general framework for the import
of beef by Japan was settled. [Ref. 148]
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In a similar fashion, there has been an evolution in the trade patterns between
Japan and New Zealand. According to the New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Overseas Trade, the United Kingdom took 88 percent of New Zealand's exports in
1944; in 1980 the figure was 14 percent. Japan in 1948 took. 0.03 percent, whereas in
1980, that figure rose to 12 percent [Ref. 149: p. 51]. During his week-long visit to
several South Pacific nations, Prime Minister Nakasone's main item on his agenda was
the promotion of increasing economic and cultural cooperation. He proposed, as a
show of good faith, to increase trade with Australia and strengthen fishing cooperation
with New Zealand. Moreover, the Japanese prime minister promised that Japan will
cooperate with the Australian effort for industrial reorganization in the scientific and
technological fields. [Ref. 150: pp. M1-M2]
As Japan's trade with its Pacific neighbors continues to grow, particularly in its
energy requirements and as part of Tokyo's efforts at diversification, Japan will
increasingly turn toward Australia as one of the key suppliers of energy, as well as raw
materials. Despite the ubiquitous trade imbalances suffered by many of its neighbors,
Japan is becoming more sensitive to their plight and is becoming more involved in an
effort to help reduce tensions. Painful memories of the Pacific War are slowly but
surely fading; Japan's relations with Australia and New Zealand are continuing to
warm. In both Australia and New Zealand there are Australian-Japanese and New
Zealand-Japanese Foundations, and there is a much greater interest being shown in
Japanese studies than formerly [Ref. 149: p. 52]. In addition, during his visit to New
Zealand, Prime Ministers Nakasone and Lange agreed to set up a 'working holiday'
system to expand youth exchanges to strengthen bilateral ties. [Ref. 151: p. M2]
The considerable and increasing trade between Japan and Australia would
naturally require protection in time of war. Because of their limited military strengths,
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the two countries are not capable of protecting this trade (assuming that the Soviet
Union would be the antagonist). Australia shares the view with the United States that
Japan needs to strengthen its defense capability, particularly in developing a capacity
to patrol sea lanes. As discussed earlier, in order for Japan to effectively safeguard
1,000 miles of maritime routes southeast and southwest from Japan, it would require
increasing the present Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force by a factor of three.
Australia, with a much smaller naval strength than even Japan's, could do little to
safeguard any of its three major routes-north to Southeast Asia and Japan, northwest
to Europe and northeast to the United States [Ref. 152: p. 249].
In spite of Australia's urging Japan to increase its maritime strength, Australians,
like their ASEAN neighbors, seem to have ambivalent feelings over a militarily strong
Japan: Officials in the Australian Labor Party (ALP) have voiced concerns over
Japan's possible development as a regional security actor beyond the levels required for
self defense, either from external (US) pressure or internal decisions, believing that such
a development would have a destabilizing effect on the Asian-Pacific region [Ref. 153:
p. 200]. In a speech given by the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the
Honorable William G. Hayden addressed the issue of the Japanese security role as
follows:
The Prime Minister and I have stated publicly Australia's appreciation of Japan's
right to determine its own defence policies in the light of its domestic and
regional sensitivities. Australia recognises that Japan makes an effective
contribution to Western strategic interests through its Self-Defence Forces and
the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. We welcome the increasing role Japan is
playing diplomatically and economically in the region and we are confident that
the general direction of Japan's defence policies are exclusively for self-defence
(emphasis added). [Ref. 154: p. 2]
The generally negative Australian attitudes towards a militarized Japan are
historical-the Japanese entry into World War II traumatized Australia as its northern
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cities were bombed, providing well-founded fears of an Japanese invasion. After all,
misgivings about Japan's future intentions were key factors in the formation of the
ANZUS Treaty and subsequent defense postures. However, Australia will begin to feel
the after-effects of changing world attitudes towards the Japanese, particularly from
one of its closest allies, the United States. Because of its warm ties with the US,
Australia may find itself reevaluating its defense policies in regard to Japan. As Henry
Albinski put it: "American influences on Australia have been deep and varied, on
balanced welcomed, rarely actively resisted" [Ref. 155: p. 419]. The influence of
American strategic thinking notwithstanding, Australia must eventually come to terms
with Japan's global political and economic standing. Indeed, increased
Japanese-Australian military collaboration might be a logical complement to ASEAN
aspiralions for Asian-Pacific countries moving toward more stable relations with the
major powers. [Refs. 153,156: p. 205, pp. 13-15]
As discussed in the previous section, the growing ASEAN acceptance of an
enhanced Japanese military role may help influence both New Zealand and Australia in
adopting a more relaxed posture towards the Japanese. It may not be fair to assume
that because Australia and New Zealand have joined the Five Power Defense
Arrangements (FPDA), the Southeast Asian members of FPDA have had an undue
influence in Australia's and New Zealand's strategic thinking; however, I will argue
that there has been a trend towards a convergence on security issues.
The linkage between the ASEAN countries' defense attitudes and the defense
policies of their neighbors to the south is best illustrated in the following speech given
by the Australian Defense Minister. In the words of the Honorable G.G.D. Scholes:
The purpose of this conference is to examine the strategic situations of Australia
and Isew Zealand. . . .We are located together in an area of the globe where
geographic considerations influence our security outlook in the same important
ways. . . .
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A fundamental aim of Australian defence policy is to continue to strengthen the
commonality of strategic interests between Australia and the countries of
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. . . .To strengthen the commonality of
strategic interests between Australia and (these) friendly countries. . .defence
relationships have been broadened and strengthened. [Ref. 157]
Like its Southeast Asian neighbors, Australia and New Zealand will begrudgingly
recognize that the increase of Japan's military power will be an inevitable and
legitimate step in its plans for improving its own self-defense.
Returning once more to the sea lanes issue, there is still another incentive for
Australia in adopting a more positive attitude towards Japan, one less imbued with
concerns of a militarily resurgent and potentially hostile Asian power. The relative
decline of US capability to defend Japanese merchant shipping is spurring Japan to
develop strategies to meet what it considers to be a real threat in the short term.
Logically, it follows then, that a threat to Japan's shipping is automatically a threat to
Australia's—more than half of Australia's trade by volume is with Japan or Northeast
Asia, and some 30 percent of its economy is either directly or indirectly dependent on
unobstructed shipping routes to Japan [Ref. 158: p. 46]. Furthermore, this inexorable
drive towards defense improvements is coupled with Japan's need to exercise greater
political weight in a world much affected by its unquestioned international economic
status.
Despite Australia's informal mutual defense arrangements, its main international
security obligation, however, is not local or even regional, but global. Australia plays a
part in the defense of Western interests and the Western economic and strategic
systems, including Japan [Ref. 159: p. 268]. Though Japan is barred from becoming
involved in formal collective security arrangements, there are no legal restrictions
preventing it from participating in joint military exercises, as evidenced by its
participation in US-sponsored "Rim Pac" joint naval maneuvers involving Canada,
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Australia, New Zealand, Britain, and Indonesia [Ref. 160]. Overcoming present
Australian misgivings about Japan's expanded security role in the Asian- Pacific region
could be accomplished through continued joint exercises with Australia, which could
then eventually lead to an informal mutual defense cooperation between Japan and
Australia. In his private talks with Prime Minister Hawke and New Zealand Prime
Minister David Lange during his Pacific tour in January 1985, Japan's Nakasone
stressed the need for "unity among members of the Western alliance", quietly
reaffirming his approval of the ANZUS pact which links those two countries with the
United States [Ref. 161: p. 28].
The viability of that pact, however, was severely shaken when New Zealand
refused to allow a port-call by the US destroyer Buchannan in February 1985 because
of the nuclear weapons on board. By the same token, Wellingtons's firm stand on its
non-nuclear policy of not allowing port-calls by nucleared-powered ships or ships
carrying nuclear weapons thrust Japan into the world limelight because of a similar
policy regarding nuclear weapons. Such a strong stance by a long-time ally of the US
would at first seem to put Japan on the spot since the Japanese have for many years
skirted the nuclear weapons issue by the discreet use of a policy that calls for "prior
consultations" under which Washington is to seek Tokyo's agreement to any
introduction of such weapons into Japan. As it turned out, Japan's reaction to New
Zealand's ban on nuclear weapons was minimal—Nakasone did not directly urge Lange
to modify his position, nor did he gave any indication that Tokyo would change its
policy either: "New Zealand is New Zealand, Japan is Japan," he said [Ref. 162: p. CI].
Although Lange's behavior has thus far not upset the fragile understanding
Japan has maintained on the nuclear issue, there has been a certain amount of fallout
from the New Zealand affair which included efforts by the JSP to organize support for
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a pan-Pacific nuclear-free zone, and an upsurge in local anti-nuclear movements in
Japanese cities and prefectures. Though it appears that for the time being Japan has
survived the worst effects of the Wellington trauma, clearly, there could be major
long-term strategic implications for Japan if there is a collapse in the security
arrangements under the ANZUS alliance or a drastic re-negotiation of the pact.
However, Tokyo is confident that any re-negotiation will be long in coming and that
the time to consider its implications for Japan will be after, not before, the details of
any such a re-negotiation is made clear. [Ref. 163: pp. 24-25]
The following excerpt from an editorial in the pro-government Japanese
newspaper, Sankei, summarizes perfectly Tokyo's stand on the nuclear issue and its
relationship with the United States:
We Japanese cannot intervene directly in the argument. However, as for the case
of Japan, which is in a similar situation as a maritime country, we cannot but
think that the solidarity of the West is necessary, first of all, in order to counter
the Soviet military build-up and to support the progress of US-Soviet
disarmament negotiations. To be concrete, it is to fulfill the mutual obligations
of the Japan-US alliance under the Japan-US Security Treaty. In this sense, we
want to confirm that opposition in Japan to port-calls by US naval ships is
illogical. In an age of nuclear weapons, there cannot be a strategy taking only
conventional war into consideration. [Ref. 164: p. 10]
C. THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY CONCEPT
The phenomenal growth of the Asia-Pacific economy during the 1970s has led to
several proposals for cooperation in a wider area, that of the Pacific basin as a whole.
The countries included in this region would be the five Pacific OECD members
(Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand), three East Asian
NICs (South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong), and the six ASEAN countries
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Brunei), as well as a
number of Pacific island states [Ref. 165: p. 144].
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The concept of a Pacific Basin Community (PBC) that would encompass the
aforementioned countries is not new and has been spreading rapidly of late, having
already an impressive foundation. Australia's Prime Minister Hawke enthusiastically
advocated the PBC concept during his 1984 tour of ASEAN, China, Japan, and South
Korea, and again in 1985 during the Japan-Australia Summit talks held in Canberra;
President Reagan of the United States espoused a similar idea during his Asian tour in
1984 [Refs. 166,167,168: p. 192, p. 18].
The Pacific Basin contains some of the world's fastest growing economies and
those countries' trade and commercial relations with each other and the rest of the
world are becoming increasingly significant in global terms. These economic and
commercial realities are beginning to surpass in importance the traditional trade
relationship with the Atlantic as evidenced by the fact that in 1962, the western Pacific
(East Asia and Australasia) accounted for only 9 percent of world output; by 1985
however, that figure had climbed to 13 percent. In addition, the proportion of world
exports from Pacific Basin countries doubled to 19 percent between 1962 and 1984.
Countries in the Pacific Basin currently conduct more than 60 percent of their
commerce with each other, as opposed to 45 percent in 1962. [Ref. 169: p. 79]
The industrial growth rate of these countries has been averaging at greater than 7
percent annually. Manufacturing industries of the NICs, such as the ROK and
Taiwan, and the ASEAN countries, have grown phenomenally in the 1960s and 1970s.
According to the World Bank's "Report on World Development," the average growth
rate (real) in the ROK was 17.6 percent in the 1960s and 16.6 percent in the 1970s, in
Taiwan it was 17.3 percent and 13.2 percent, and in Malaysia and Thailand it was 10.6
percent and 11.8 percent [Ref. 170]. One of the important factors for the rapid growth
of the manufacturing industries of Asian countries was the influence of Japan, which
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supplied capital goods and intermediate products to these countries smoothly. Japan
especially played an important role in the industrialization of the NICs and the
ASEAN countries with its capacity to supply various kinds of products, ranging from
raw materials to finished goods.
Countries of the PBC share not only the abundant marine resources of the
Pacific Ocean, but also the vast amount of seabed mineral resources contained there.
Moreover, in demographic terms, the population of the region is able to sustain
continued economic growth since it accounts for nearly 60 percent of the world's
population. The area is also gaining significance in terms of commercial shipping and
air transportation as it is expected to be the most important area in the world for the
production of petroleum by the year 2000. [Refs. 171,172: pp. 400-401, p. 116]
The advent of a "Pacific era" has come to be recognized definitely throughout
the world. This recognition generally is based on historical and geographical views that
there is a discernible westward drift of civilization from the Mediterranean to the
Atlantic and now to the Pacific [Ref. 173: pp. 38-39]. In any case, the prospect is that
the Pacific will continue to show dynamic economic growth in the future. It is because
of this phenemonal growth that we may see the focus of world activity, influence and
decision shifting to this region. Norman Bailey, director of planning at the White
House National Security Council (NSC), disclosed this statement in a speech before
the International Monetary Conference in Brussels in 1983, a line endorsed by both
NSC adviser William Clark and President Reagan himself: "The economic centre of
gravity of the world is rapidly shifting to the Pacific basin-including the Pacific areas
of North America" [Ref. 174: p. 55].
The thriving economy of the Pacific basin has given further incentive for a
proposal to form a wider economic cooperation among the members of the region,
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thereby reinforcing the area's own trend of growth while being shielded from any
negative influences in other regions of the world. It appears that the Japanese concept
of a Pacific Community was first pioneered by the Japanese economist Kojima Kiyoshi
in 1965, when he proposed to form the Pacific Free Trade Area (PAFTA) of the
United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Although this proposal
never materialized, it did lead to the manifestation of a forum known as the
Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD), which was strongly
supported by the Japanese government [Ref. 165: p. 146]. In 1967, Japanese and
Australian businessmen who had been coming together annually for some years in a
bilateral forum, the Australian-Japan Business Cooperation Committee, decided to
form a larger group incorporating members from Canada, New Zealand, and the
United States. Thus was born the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC). [Ref. 172:
p. 116]
A more important development was the establishment of the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Conference (PECC) in Canberra in September 1980. This conference
recommended that a standing committee be set up to coordinate information exchange
as well as to establish task, forces to study specific issues relating to the problems of
economic cooperation. These objectives were accomplished by the second PECC
which was held in Bangkok in 1982. [Refs. 165,161: p. 147, p. 29]
The concept of a PBC has been the subject of much discussion and debate
among a number of Pacific Basin countries, and revolves around two closely related
issues, that of desirability and feasibility. As mentioned earlier, there are many
incentives for establishing a PBC, the foremost being economic. In spite of the
obvious economic benefits to be gained from a formation of a PBC, there are, however,
major obstacles to be overcome in order to establish one. For example, significant
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cultural, social, and linguistic differences exist between the various countries of the
Pacific Basin. Moreover, the level of technological and industrial development vary
widely among them as well. Though not insurmountable, these differences would
create difficulties and hinder efforts at reaching mutual understandings and the
movement toward realizing regional aspirations. To win support for the PBC idea,
Japan, along with the United States, would have to:
. . .demonstrate their respect for developing nations' sovereign powers through
investment and technological assistance, reducing protectionist trade policies, and
cooperating in efforts to stabilize prices of these nations' export goods.
[Ref. 174: p. 62]
In order to overcome possible tension arising out of the cultural and political
diversity of the Pacific Basin countries, Japan has been playing an important role by
promoting cultural exchanges with them as well as with the rest of the world through
such organizations as the Japan Foundation [Ref. 175: p. 48], and the JOCV, which
has thus far been highly successful in exporting not only traditional Japanese culture
and arts, but also modern culture and scientific achievements. One specific area in
which Foreign Ministry officials readily admit as policy goal is the "development of
human resource potential--in other words, education" [Ref. 161: p. 31]. The Pacific
Basin Cooperation Study Group (PBCSG) established in 1979 by Prime Minister
Ohira, recommended that one way in which Japan could foster a more cohesive
inter-relationship among Pacific states would be by making its universities drop their
ban on the hiring of foreign professors and making it easier for foreign students'
admission into Japanese universities. One result of the PBCSG recommendation has
been a doubling of foreign students in Japan, from approximately 5250 in 1975 to
nearly 10,000 in 1983. [Refs. 161,176: p. 30, p. 90]
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The formation of a PBC, no matter how informal it may be, still calls for
Japanese initiative and consensus among the Pacific nations. The establishment of the
Pacific community concept has taken on increasing importance as a forum in which
Japan would be able to fulfill the international responsibilities it can no longer ignore.
Japan will have to take the initiative in promoting stability in the Pacific community
through its economic diplomacy. However, the danger here for Japan lies in the very
successes of its economic influence in Asia—the progress of industrialization leads to a
structure which makes it necessary for these countries to rely heavily on Japan for
capital goods and intermediate products. Moreover, there is a possibility that Japan's
intention of maintaining a regional, if not a global, order will be misunderstood and
that the concept of a Pacific community will be viewed as another Japanese attempt at
hegemony or even a resuscitation of the Dai Toa Kyoeiken.
Nevertheless, countries of the Pacific Basin should realize that they have
benefitted tremendously from the expansion of the Pacific Basin economy in terms of
lower prices for higher quality goods and in expanded exports and investments to this
region-they should also not forget that Japan has been instrumental in that expansion
of the Pacific Basin [Ref. 177: pp. 598-600]. If Japan desires to become successful in
strengthening the idea of Pacific cooperation, it should do so from a long-range,
comprehensive point of view, and concentrate on gradual cooperation in the
non-military fields such as the economic and technological fields instead; Japan's
"Comprehensive Security Policy" would do nicely.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
There remain few doubts about the importance of the role which Japan will play
in the Asian-Pacific region in the 1980s and beyond. Being the dominant trade partner
for almost all the countries in the region, as well as being the primary source of aid,
technology and investment, Japan is becoming one of the major determinants of the
region's future. A new climate of opinion has been slowly evolving in Japan,
foreshadowing a greater willingness to become more responsibly involved in regional
and world affairs. Since Prime Minister Fukuda's visit in 1977 to ASEAN and the
subsequent announcement of the Fukuda Doctrine in 1977 whereby Japan pledged to
double its level of foreign aid to the countries of ASEAN, the scope and depth of the
relations between Japan and ASEAN have improved considerably from what they were
more than ten years ago. As exemplified by Prime Minister Nakasone, successive
Japanese prime ministers have made it a rule to visit ASEAN countries as soon as
possible after taking office, while Japanese foreign ministers are regular participants at
ASEAN's expanded ministerial conferences [Ref. 165: p. 157].
The Japanese rapproachement with the PRC in 1978, without waiting for
Washington to normalize its relations with Peking, were signals of a change in the
Japanese international outlook. This has paid off handsomely, as evidenced by a series
of visits by Chinese leaders-Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Hua Guofeng in 1980, Zhao
Jiyang in 1982, and Hu Yao-Bang in 1983-marking the growing relationship between
Japan and China. Support for close Tokyo-Beijing ties has filtered down to the
grass-roots level as well. According to a public opinion survey on diplomacy taken in
June 1984 by the Prime Minister's office, 77 percent of those surveyed believed that of
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all the Asian nations, Japan should maintain close relations with China, up from 64
percent in 1978 [Ref. 176: p. 146].
Similarly, the style and vision of Prime Minister Nakasone no doubt contributed
greatly to the current warm relations between Tokyo and Seoul. As Japan becomes
more conscious of the fact that it needs to balance its economic dynamism by greater
political involvement in regional affairs, relations with its fast-developing neighbor to
the west have taken on new meaning and a sense of urgency, as a good relationship
with South Korea becomes increasingly important in the maintenance of stability in the
Asian-Pacific region. That relationship will continue to be affected by DPRK-ROK
developments. Though South Korea may never relinquish the fears that Japan will
move independently regarding its policy toward North Korea, it is safe to predict that
Tokyo will continue to give top priority to its relations with Seoul and exercise caution
in its dealings with Pyongyang so as not to jeopardize its friendly relationship with the
ROK.
Other indicators of a change in the Japanese attitude towards its international
outlook can be found in the waning of Japanese opposition to the U.S.-Japan security
treaty and to Japan's Self-Defense Forces. Opinion polls (see Table 11) confirm the
observation that a majority of the Japanese people favors the security treaty and the
retention of the Self-Defense Forces.
Although some of the more hawkish Japanese leaders have called for a stronger,
autonomous self-defense force, independent of the American alliance, this option is
unlikely to be implemented in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, the majority of
Japan's policy makers do appear to favor a larger role for Japan in defending its own
security interests, be they foreign or domestic. Japan can contribute indirectly to
Asian-Pacific security in one extremely important way by enhancing its own capacity
115
TABLE 11
ARE THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES NECESSARY?
PMIO* Polls 1959-1981
QUESTION: "Do you think that it is better to have the SDF or do you think
it better not to have the SDF?"
1959 1963 1965 1967
Better to have 39% 52% 82% 77%
Better not to have 5 3 5 6
Don't know 12 7 13 17
Better to have 73% 79% 83%
Better not to have 12 8 7
Don't know 15 13 10




*Prime Minister Information Office
Compiled from two reports (dated October 1983 and May 1984) published by
the East Asia & Pacific Branch Office of Research, US Information Agency,
Washington, DC.
to defend the Japanese homeland and surrounding seas. In a geopolitical sense, then, a
secure and stable Japan is integral to the maintenance of security in Northeast Asia,
and by extension, the entire Western Pacific.
Consequently, in the long run, there will emerge a Japan with a markedly
enhanced security role. The primary reason for this change lies in the strategic
environment, which is likely to become considerably more forbidding. Guarantees of
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uninterrupted oil flow from the Persian Gulf can no longer be assured—neither can
stability on the Korean peninsula. The Soviet military build-up in Asia and elsewhere
in the world shows no sign of abating whatsoever, while at the same time, American
military protection will become increasingly stretched in the Pacific as U.S. security
interests continue the shift westwards towards the Persian Gulf region.
Should Japan decide not to pursue a policy of increasing quantitatively and
qualitatively both its defense forces and defense role, it could face possible
neutralization of its military efficacy by the USSR, as it can be expected to see the
Soviet Union continue to exert its military and political pressure on Tokyo by
demonstrating more frequently and impudently its naval and air power in the areas
around Japan. In addition, as Japan moves forward in its quest for economic security,
it will find itself unable to ignore the linkage between its economic and military
policies, facing increased demands from Washington, Seoul, and abroad to reconsider
its role in the regional security network. Japan's economic preponderance is already
the cause for the current strained trade relations between the US and South Korea,
relationships which Japan could ill afford to exacerbate with charges of "free-riding" by
not shouldering a fairer share of the burden for the defense of East Asia.
The relationship between Japan and the United States will be severly strained
unless Tokyo displays more than superficial alterations in its military and economic
policies. The importance of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty becomes even more critical
because it forms the framework on which international politics in Asia is based. As
established earlier in this thesis, many countries of Asia are finding that the existence
and indeed, the maintenance of friendly Japan-U.S. relations based on the security
treaty is making a positive contribution to peace and stability in Asia.
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Tremendous economic growth has brought Japan international prestige but it is
beginning to recognize that being an economic power also entails political
responsibilities, and that Japan can no longer afford to remain an "island of prosperity
in an ocean of instability" [Ref. 178: p. 55]. Japan, which has achieved an international
status as a major economic power, probably will start to play an enhanced political
and military role as well. In so doing, it will give top priority to cementing its ties
with the United States and strengthening its relations with China, South Korea, the
ASEAN states, Australia and New Zealand.
Japan's role in Asia-Pacific, for the present, will continue to be played chiefly
through economics and diplomacy. However, as Japan's international economic
activities increase, the more they become a crucial element of its overall security policy.
Thus, - as Japan becomes more involved in economic interaction with developing
countries where it trades ands invests, its relations with them will carry over into the
realm of politics despite its efforts otherwise. Japan's voice in the political and
diplomatic realms will grow in importance as Japan seeks to more directly influence the
course of events in the Asian-Pacific region.
Considering the international situation as it is today, Japan must not lose sight
of the dhection in which its leaders have shifted its foreign policy. Japan shares with
the United States and the free world, the basic ideals of a free, democratic society and
a peaceful world order made up of nations capable of settling their problems without
recourse to force, through international institutions such as the United Nations.
Despite the extremes of viewpoints in the political spectrum, the majority of the
Japanese people believe in these ideals.
What is perhaps the most significant fact about this is that Japan has become a
source of encouragement for those newly rising countries that are finding the road to
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prosperity and stability a difficult one indeed. Japan's success in becoming Asia's most
advanced industrial and scientific nation, after many years of "conflict between the
forces of totalitarianism and democracy" [Ref. 179: p. 333], seems to inspire in the
other nations of the Asia-Pacific, faith in themselves, democracy, and the preservation
of peace through international law and order. Japan's immense economic power
inevitably entails a dominant position in the Asian-Pacific region, but it is essential
that Japan maintain and promote friendly bilateral relations with its neighbors there.
Japan's expanding economic, political, cultural, and diplomatic activities will no longer
be geographically centered, but will ultimately be spread around the world.
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